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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2(a)-
3(2) (h) as this is an appeal from a final judgment and 
order in a domestic relations action. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Appellant contends that the Trial Court has 
misunderstood or misapplied the law in determining that 
there had been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances concerning child support. In reality, 
Appellant is attacking the Court's Findings of Fact. As 
such, the Appellant has applied the wrong standard of 
review and has failed to marshal all of the evidence and, 
despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Findings of 
Fact were clearly erroneous. Therefore the Appellate 
Court should affirm the Trial Court's child support 
award. 
2. The Trial Court did not error in determining 
that there had been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances with respect to Appellantfs ability to 
provide support for her minor children. 
3. After determining that a substantial and 
material change in circumstances had occurred with 
respect to the child support award, the Trial Court did 
not error in applying the presumptive child support 
guidelines in Section 78-45-1, et. seq. U.C.A. 
1 
4. After setting a presumptive amount of child 
support pursuant to the statute, the Trial Court did not 
error in requiring that Appellant rebut the presumption. 
5. After receiving Appellant's evidence in 
rebuttal to the child support guidelines, the Court 
evaluated each of the factors contained in Section 78-45-
7(3), U.C.A., and granted some reduction in the child 
support to accommodate Appellant's expenses. 
6. The Modification Court's review of child 
support was not bound to the language utilized by the 
Divorce Court's child support award but rather, the 
Modification Court was free to conduct an entire review 
of child support once it had determined that there had 
been a substantial and material change of circumstances 
with respect to said child support award since the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As more fully discussed in Point I of the Argument, 
the sound discretion of the Trial Court in establishing 
a child support award will not be overturned unless the 
Trial Court's Findings are clearly erroneous or are a 
clear abuse of discretion. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; also see authorities cited in Point I of 
this brief. 
2 
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and 
are given no special deference on appeal. Also see 
authorities cited in Point I of this brief. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
References to the Trial Transcript will be made as 
follows: (TT ). Such reference will be utilized 
because the District Court Clerk did not paginate the 
Trial Transcript. References to the Findings of Fact 
entered by the Trial Court at the time of the divorce 
will be made as follows: (DFF ). References to the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact during the Petition for 
Modification proceeding will be made as follows: (MFF 
). Addenda in the brief will be referred to as 
follows: (ADD ). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE CASELAW 
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Ann.: 
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated provides for 
continuing jurisdiction in the Trial Court to make 
subsequent changes or new orders after the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
Section 78-45-1 et. seq.r U.C.A., The Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act, Specifically: 
Section 78-45-7(3), which designates factors to be 
utilized in the event that the Court determines that 
there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive 
child support established by the statute. 
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Section 78-45-7.2, U.C.A. which sets presumptive 
child support guidelines and makes same applicable to all 
orders establishing or modifying child support after July 
1, 1989. 
Caselaw: 
Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993), 
interprets the presumptive child support guidelines and 
explains the methodology for applying same. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order modifying a 
Decree of Divorce previously entered by the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, State 
of Utah. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce in the original divorce proceeding were 
entered on January 18, 1991. An Amended Decree of Divorce 
Nunc Pro Tunc was subsequently entered on February 4, 
1992. The Amended Decree is not of significance in this 
action. (All documents from original action are included 
as ADD A). 
Plaintiff/Appellee filed the current Petition for 
Modification on February 10, 1994 alleging a substantial 
and material change in circumstance concerning the issues 
relevant to a child support modification (ROA 146). The 
Petition for Modification was tried before the Honorable 
Bryce K. Bryner on August 26, 1994. After receiving sworn 
testimony and exhibits on behalf of each of the parties 
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and entering some Findings of Fact and Rulings in Open 
Court, the Court took the matter under advisement and 
entered its Memorandum Decision on August 29, 1994. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Order 
Modifying the Decree of Divorce were signed and entered 
on November 4, 1994 (ADD B). Defendant/Appellant filed 
Notice of Appeal on November 23, 1994 (ROA 211). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee offers the following statement of relevant 
facts in the present case: 
1. The Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter referred to 
as "David") and the Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as "Gloria") were divorced by Decree entered 
by the above-entitled Court on January 18, 1991. 
2. The Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree 
awarded David the sole legal care and custody of his 
three (3) minor children, namely, Amanda Ashley Hight, 
born October 25, 1985; Adam Parker Hight, born June 5, 
1987 and Shawn David Hight, also born June 5, 1987. 
3. The Decree of Divorce did not reguire Gloria to 
pay child support to David for various reasons which were 
outlined in specific Findings of Fact entered by the 
Divorce Court. All of the applicable Findings of Fact are 
as follows: 
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Findings of Fact from divorce: 
DFF5 The Court finds that the Defendant earned 
a gross income of $8,963.00 to the first 
part of October, 1990 from her part-time 
employment with the United States Postal 
Department and, therefore, the Court 
finds that her average gross income is 
the sum of $990.00 per month for the year 
1990. 
DFF6 The Court finds that the Plaintiff is 
currently employed at Sears as a 
repairman and earns approximately 
$2,400.00 per month from said employment. 
DFF9 The Court will not require the Defendant 
to pay child support to the Plaintiff to 
assist with the support of the children 
at this time because the Defendant will 
need all of her available income to take 
care of her living expenses as well as 
meet payments on the large debt 
obligations which she owes for her 
medical treatment and expenses. [Emphasis 
added]. 
DFF10 Based on the Plaintiff's present income 
and his obligation to solely support his 
children because of the Defendant's 
current limited earning capacity and debt 
level and because of the Court's order 
requiring the Plaintiff to contribute to 
the payment of medical debts for the 
benefit of the Defendant, the Court will 
not order the Plaintiff to pay the 
Defendant any alimony. [Emphasis added]. 
DFF11 The Plaintiff is further ordered to pay 
one-half of all of the outstanding 
medical bills incurred by the Defendant 
as shown on her Financial Declaration. 
The Defendant is also ordered to pay one-
half of all of the outstanding medical 
bills incurred by her as designated in 
her Financial Declaration. [Irrelevant 
portions of FF11 have been deleted] . 
[Medical bills outlined on Defendant's 
Financial Declaration totaled $17,805.90; 
See ADD F). 
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DFF12 Each of the parties is ordered to 
maintain medical, dental and optical 
insurance on the children if it is 
available through a group policy at their 
place of employment and each is ordered 
to pay one-half of all reasonable and 
necessary major medical, dental and/or 
optical expense incurred for and on 
behalf of the children which is not 
covered by a policy of insurance. The 
Plaintiff's insurance shall be designated 
as the primary carrier. 
4. At the beginning of 1994, David became aware 
that Gloria had returned to her employment at the United 
States Postal Service on a full time basis over a year 
earlier (TT 9-10). He filed the current Petition for 
Modification on February 10, 1994 (ROA 146). 
5. Gloria earned in excess of $41,000.00 pursuant 
to her 1993 W-2 (TT 17-18; Trial Ex. 2). She continued to 
earn at that rate of pay throughout all of 1994 until 
approximately four weeks prior to the hearing date in 
August of 1994 (TT 17-18). 
6. Approximately four weeks before the hearing 
date, Gloria voluntarily accepted a new position at the 
Postal Service which reduced her income to $2,838.00 per 
month or $34,056.00 per year. The Court used this reduced 
income in determining Gloria's proportional share of the 
child support even though it had not been her historic 
earnings (MFF 3). 
7. Even though Gloria had regained her full time 
employment, she failed to make any voluntary child 
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support or required medical payments to David from the 
date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce until the time 
of the Petition for Modification (TT 8; ADD C). 
8. After receiving testimony, the Court entered a 
Finding from the bench. The Court found that there had 
been a 300% increase in Gloria's earning capacity since 
the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and that 
she had discharged all of the debts assigned to her in 
the Decree of Divorce by way of bankruptcy. The Court 
found that the Decree of Divorce was based upon an 
earning capacity of $990.00 for Gloria but that she now 
had a sum of at least $2,838.00 per month available to 
her. The Court found that such a change constituted a 
material and substantial change in circumstances with 
respect to the issue of child support (TT 56; MFF 3 & 5; 
MCL 1). 
9. Gloria argued that the Court could not modify 
the child support because she alleged that her expenses 
had increased in direct proportion to her income. The 
Court declined to accept that line of reasoning (TT 45-
56) . 
10. After determining that there had been a 
substantial and material change in circumstances with 
respect to the issues involving child support, the Court 
reopened the issue of child support and allowed Gloria to 
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present any evidence that she desired to offer to show 
why the presumptive child support guidelines should not 
be applied (TT 52-53, 55-57). 
11. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
subsequently its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Petition for Modification on November 4, 1994 
(ADD B). 
12. The Court found that based on the present 
income of the parties, the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines provided for child support to be paid from 
Gloria to David in the sum of $689.00 per month; however, 
the Court then stated "the only question remaining to the 
Court is whether good cause exists to deviate, at 
Defendant's request, from the guideline amount" (MFF 7; 
ADD B). 
13. The Court then commenced a detailed analysis of 
Gloria's income and monthly expenses. The Court examined 
her expenses to determine which of those expenses might 
be extraordinary. After completing the detailed analysis, 
the Court found grounds to rebut the presumed child 
support and, therefore, reduced same to the sum of 
$525.00 per month (MFF 8 and 9; ADD B). 
14. The Court declined to make the child support 
retroactive back to the filing of the Petition even 
though the Petition had been filed for over one (1) year. 
The Court reasoned that the Defendant would not be able 
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to pay the retroactive child support since she had no 
savings (MFF 10; ADD B). 
15. In establishing child support at the sum of 
$525.00 per month, the Court reviewed each of the factors 
contained in Section 78-45-7(3), U.C.A. and provided a 
detailed evaluation of same (MFF 11; ADD B). 
16. David was awarded one-half of his Court costs 
and attorney's fees for the Modification Hearing (MFF 15; 
MCL 4; ADD B). 
17. Gloria's Notice of Appeal was timely filed (ROA 
211) . 
18. Gloria has not paid any child support, 
attorney's fees, medical payments or child care costs 
since the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce (ADD 
C). 
19. After the entry of the Court's Order on 
Petition for Modification, Gloria threatened David with 
the current appeal unless he would take less than the 
Court ordered child support (ADD C). 
20. Even though Gloria's appeal does not raise any 
issues concerning the child care costs or the attorney's 
fee award, Gloria has failed to pay any of those sums 
either (ADD C). 
21. David and the minor children are suffering 
substantial economic hardship as a result of the current 
appeal (ADD C). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
David contends that Gloria has failed to apply the 
appropriate standard of review in this case. An analysis 
of Gloria's arguments demonstrates that she is attacking 
the Trial Courtf s Finding of Fact with respect to its 
determination that there had been a substantial and 
material change of circumstance concerning the child 
support issue since the time of entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. Gloria is required to marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the Findings and demonstrate, 
despite the evidence, that the Trial Court's Findings 
were clearly erroneous. Gloria has failed in that 
responsibility; therefore, this Court should refuse to 
consider her attack upon the Trial Courtfs child support 
award. 
In Arguendot Gloria contends that the language used 
by the original Divorce Court in determining child 
support created a standard for review that must be used 
by a future Court in making any modifications of the 
original child support award. Gloria presents no 
statutory authority and no caselaw for her position. 
Additionally, she ignores the current child support 
statute and offers caselaw which was decided years before 
the adoption of the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
as currently expressed in Section 78-45-1 et. seq., Utah 
Code Annotated. Additionally, her argument requires a 
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distorted and inaccurate interpretation of the language 
contained in the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce, Since Gloria has failed to 
offer any viable legal argument to attack the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact or its determination or 
application of the law, the Trial Court's child support 
award should be affirmed. 
David contends that Gloria has filed the current 
appeal for the sole purpose of thwarting David's attempts 
to gain contribution from Gloria for the support of the 
children. As evidence of what David believes to be the 
real purpose of the appeal, he points to the total lack 
of meritorious arguments offered by Gloria in her brief 
and further points to her consistent non-performance of 
all orders of the Court, most of which are not under 
appeal. David requests that this Court find that the 
current appeal is without merit and was either frivolous 
or intended to delay the collection of child support. He 
further requests that this Court establish a time for 
hearing pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure or, alternatively, that the matter be 
remanded to the Trial Court for determination of 
Appellee's reasonable attorney's fees and Court costs on 
appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
SINCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
WHICH SUPPORTED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND, 
DESPITE SUCH EVIDENCE, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS WERE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO 
CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT 
AWARD. 
A review of Appellant's argument indicates that the 
Appellant is really attacking the Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact and not just its Conclusions of Law. The Trial 
Court entered numerous and express Findings of Fact in 
the case at bar. Those Findings should be reviewed in 
light of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
Rule 52: Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury..., the 
court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A;...Findings of Fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, ghalj not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of 
the court. It will be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence 
or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court... 
[Emphasis added by Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court on October 
13 
30, 1986 and became effective 
on January 1, 1987.] 
An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule 52(a) 
demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the facts 
of the case at the Appellate level. Since a divorce 
action is an equitable case, the Trial Courts have been 
given broad discretion in making awards. Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); Sukin v. Sukinr 842 P.2d 
922 (Utah App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah App. 1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 
1989); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). 
Appellate Courts have traditionally granted great 
deference to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and do 
not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. In 
reviewing an award of child support, the Appellate Courts 
accord substantial deference to the Trial Court's 
Findings and give the Trial Court considerable latitude 
in fashioning the appropriate relief. Watson v. Watson, 
837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). Additionally, Appellate Courts have 
traditionally deferred to the Trial Court for purposes of 
judging the credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; Myers, supra; Shioji, supra; 
Riche, supra. 
In Riche v. Riche, supra, this Court stated: 
Husband, in his brief on appeal, refers 
this court to evidence which conflicts 
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with the trial courtf s findings and 
supports his contention that he should 
have been awarded custody of the four 
children. However, Husband does not 
"marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to 
be ^against the clear weight of the 
evidence,! thus making them ^clearly 
erroneous. '" Bartejl, 776 P.2d at 886 
(guoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). See 
also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985); Harker v. Condominiums 
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, we 
decline to further consider Husband's 
attack on the court's findings as to 
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468). [Emphasis 
added]. 
In Shioji, the Supreme Court has also expressly 
provided: 
On appeal from a judgment of the Trial 
Court, our [Appellate Court] role is not 
to substitute our own findings for those 
of the Trial Court, but to examine the 
record for evidence supporting the 
judgment. 
(Shioji, supra, at 201) [Emphasis added] 
Given that express statement of the role of the 
Appellate Court, the Appellant is charged with the 
responsibility of (1) marshaling all the evidence in 
support of the Findings, and (2) demonstrating that, 
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
In the case at bar, Gloria contends that the Trial 
Court erred in its Conclusions of Law because it 
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"misunderstood or misapplied the Law". (See, Appellant's 
brief p. 1). However, a review of the actual argument 
(more fully discussed in Point II of this brief) reveals 
that Gloria is actually attacking the Findings of Fact of 
the Trial Court and, therefore, she has not applied the 
proper Standard of Review. She has not marshaled all of 
the evidence which was presented to the Trial Court nor 
made any attempt to evaluate the Court's reasoning nor 
has she demonstrated that the reasoning or the Findings 
based thereon were clearly erroneous. Instead, Gloria 
misstates the position of the original Trial Court (the 
Divorce Court) and then argues that the Modification 
Court is, somehow, permanently bound by the child support 
language contained in the Decree of Divorce as long as 
Gloria's expenditures exceed her income. Gloria presented 
absolutely no statutory authority for her position and 
the caselaw she presents is outdated and superseded by 
the new child support statute as will be more fully 
discussed hereafter. 
Since the Appellant has failed to marshal all of the 
evidence and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the 
Court's Findings concerning child support were clearly 
erroneous, this Court should refuse to consider any 
further attack on the Trial Court's child support award. 
Hagan v. Haganf 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and 
are given no special deference on appeal. Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). 
II 
SINCE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY VIABLE LEGAL 
ARGUMENT TO ATTACK THE TRIAL COURT" S FINDINGS OF FACT OR 
ITS DETERMINATION OR APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANT LAW, THE 
TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Appellant's position is best summarized by the last 
sentence contained in her two page Argument: 
"it was not proper for the Court to find 
that a substantial change in 
circumstances existed sufficient to 
modify Mrs. Hight's child support 
obligations without determining that Mrs. 
Hight *s present living expenses and costs 
for medical treatment and expenses had 
not also increased so as to still reguire 
all of Mrs. Hightfs present income." 
The logical extension of the Appellant's position is that 
as long as Gloria increases her expenditures faster than 
she increases her income, she should never be required to 
pay any child support. In short, if she earned a million 
dollars and spent a million and one, her children would 
not be entitled to any contribution from their mother. 
The position is indefensible for three reasons: (1) 
Appellant's argument relies upon an inaccurate and 
distorted interpretation of the child support provision 
contained in Findings of Fact originally issued in the 
divorce action; (2) Appellant's argument ignores the 
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procedures utilized and the Findings of Fact adopted by 
the Trial Court during the Petition for Modification 
process; and (3) Appellant's argument ignores the express 
language of the current child support statute and relies 
upon caselaw that is no longer applicable as a result of 
said statute. 
First, Appellant's argument relies upon an 
inaccurate and distorted interpretation of the child 
support provision contained in the Findings of Fact 
originally issued in the divorce action. Gloria quotes 
selected language from Paragraph 9 of the Divorce Court's 
Findings of Fact; however, a review of all of the 
Findings of Fact and all of the language contained 
therein demonstrates that the Court intended the child 
support award to be based only on the facts that existed 
at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce (ADD 
A) . At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Gloria was on a part-time work schedule and received an 
income of $990.00 per month from her employment (DFF 5; 
ADD A). David was working as a Sears repairman and earned 
$2,400.00 per month from his employment (DFF 6; ADD A). 
David was awarded the sole care and custody of the 
parties' three young children (DFF 7; ADD A). Gloria was 
not awarded any alimony because David's limited earning 
capacity did not allow for the payment of same while he 
was trying to support the children and also contribute to 
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the payment of Gloria's medical debts (DFF 10; ADD A). 
The Court ordered each of the parties to pay one-half of 
the $17,805.90 in medical bills incurred by Gloria after 
the separation of the parties but immediately prior to 
the trial in the divorce matter (DFF 11; ADD A; ADD F). 
With that information in mind, the Divorce Court entered 
Finding of Fact 9: 
The Court will not require Defendant 
(Gloria) to pay child support to the 
Plaintiff (David) to assist with the 
support of the children at this time 
because the Defendant will need all of 
her available income to take care of her 
living expenses as well as meet payments 
on the large debt obligations which she 
owes for her medical treatment and 
expenses. 
Gloria now contends that the language of the Divorce 
Courtf s Finding of Fact and the subsequent order stating 
that she was not required to pay any child support 
established a permanent standard for all subsequent child 
support reviews. It is her position that the Modification 
Court could not alter the child support provision in the 
Decree of Divorce unless it could first establish that 
she did not need all of her available income to take care 
of her current living expenses and medical needs. 
Appellant never established any statutory or common law 
basis for her argument. A careful review of Finding of 
Fact 9 entered at the time of the divorce indicates that 
the Divorce Court contemplated a change of the child 
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support award when Gloria regained her employment. 
Finding of Fact 9 clearly specifies "at this time" the 
Court would not award child support. All of the parties 
agree that the Trial Court maintains continuing 
jurisdiction to review child support awards when a 
substantial and material change of circumstances has 
occurred with respect to the issue to be modified. Haslam 
v. Haslamr 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982); Appellant's brief at 
p. 7. 
In the case at bar, the Modification Court heard 
considerable testimony about the dramatic increase in 
Gloria's earning capacity since the time of the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce. Additionally, it received evidence 
that she had bankrupted against all of the medical debts 
that she had at the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. Additionally, the two separate changes in the 
child support guidelines themselves since the time of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce would constitute grounds 
for a modification of the child support award if it would 
result in an increase of child support by more than 
twenty-five (25%) percent which was the situation in the 
case at bar (Section 78-45-7(3) U.C.A; ADD D). 
The Modification Court was not impressed with 
Appellant's argument at the time of the hearing and so 
advised her counsel (TT 49-57). The Modification Court 
refused to be drawn into Appellant's distorted 
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interpretation of the Divorce Court's original Findings 
of Fact and, instead, found that a 300% increase in 
Gloria's earning capacity since the time of the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce, coupled with the discharge of all 
of her debts from the time of the Decree of Divorce, 
constituted a substantial and material change in 
circumstances sufficient to reopen the issue of child 
support (MFF 3, 4, & 5; MCL 1; TT 56; ADD B). 
Since Appellant has failed to marshal any of the 
evidence which supported the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact and since Appellant has failed to provide any legal 
basis for her theory that a subsequent Court is bound by 
the Divorce Court's child support language, this Court 
should refuse to consider an attack on the Trial Court's 
child support award. 
Second, Appellant's argument ignores the procedures 
utilized and the Findings of Fact adopted by the Trial 
Court during the Petition for Modification process. 
Gloria contends that the Modification Court could not 
modify the child support award in the Decree as long as 
her present living expenses and costs for medical 
treatment had increased proportionally with her increased 
income. Her brief failed to advise this Court of the 
extensive procedural discussion which ensued during the 
hearing on the Petition for Modification. The 
Modification Court reviewed the bifurcation process, drew 
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analogies to the procedures used in custody modification 
hearings and ultimately adopted a procedure that required 
the Petitioner to establish that a substantial and 
material change in circumstances had occurred with 
respect to the issues which were determinative of the 
original child support order i.e. the relative earning 
capacities of the parties and their respective debt 
levels (TT 49-57). After receiving substantial testimony, 
the Court entered a ruling from the bench. The Court 
found that a 300% increase in Gloria's earning capacity, 
which increased her income from $990.00 per month to 
$2,838.00 per month, constituted a material and 
substantial change directly affecting her ability to pay 
child support (TT 56). Having made that determination, 
the Court then advised that the issue of child support 
would be reopened and explored anew (TT 52). The 
Modification Court then applied the Utah Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines and received extensive testimony 
offered by Gloria in an attempt to rebut the presumption 
in favor of the guidelines. The Court then entered 
specific Findings of Fact which fully explored the 
earning capacities of each of the parties, their 
respective standards of living and costs and expenses 
related thereto, their medical conditions, the needs of 
the children, the age of the parties, and their 
respective support obligations. Additionally, the Court 
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fully explored Gloria's representations concerning her 
medical expenditures (MFF 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15). 
Finally, the Court entered specific Findings to justify 
a deviation from the child support guidelines in order to 
provide Gloria with some additional funds to offset her 
medical expenses (MFF 8C & 9). Appellant has failed to 
marshal any of the evidence that supported the detailed 
Findings of Fact and ultimate orders that issued 
therefrom. She also failed to offer any legal authority 
attacking the Court's methodology. As such, the Appellant 
failed to meet her standard of review and, therefore, 
this Court should refuse to consider any further attack 
on the Trial Court's child support award. 
Third, Appellant's argument ignores the express 
language of the current child support statute and relies 
upon irrelevant caselaw that was decided under an earlier 
statute. Section 78-45-1, et. seq. U.C.A., the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act, established an entirely 
new approach to the determination of child support 
awards. Specifically, Section 78-45-7.2, provides in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Application of guidelines - Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial 
or administrative order establishing 
or modifying an award o£ child 
support entered on or after July 1, 
1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines 
shall be applied as a 
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rebuttable presumption in 
establishing or modifying the 
amount of temporary or 
permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption 
means the provisions and 
considerations required by the 
guidelines, the award amounts 
resulting from the application 
of the guidelines, and the use 
of the worksheets consistent 
with these guidelines are 
presumed to be correct, unless 
rebutted under the provisions 
of this section. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, 
enactment of the guidelines and any 
subsequent change in the guidelines 
constitutes a substantial or 
material change of circumstances as 
a ground for modification or 
adjustment of a court order, if 
there is a difference of at least 
25% between the existing order and 
the guidelines. (As amended 1994). 
[Emphasis added]. 
The statute clearly requires the application of the Utah 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines to any modification of 
a child support award entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
In the case at bar, the Modification Court adopted the 
express procedure contained in the new statute. After 
finding a substantial change of circumstances, the Court 
adopted the presumptive guidelines (TT 51-52). It then 
required that Gloria rebut the presumption to establish 
a justification for an award of child support at less 
than the amount specified in the guidelines. 
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Gloria, however, directs this Court to caselaw 
decided prior to the adoption of the presumptive child 
support guidelines. She first cites Haslam v. Haslam, 657 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1982). Contrary to her argument, the 
Haslam decision stands for the proposition that 
"provisions in the original Decree of Divorce granting 
alimony, child support and the like must be readily 
susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the needs 
which such provisions were designed to fill are subject 
to rapid and unpredictable change." Haslam, supra, at p. 
758 citing Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981). 
Nowhere does the Haslam decision attempt to tie the hands 
of the Modification Court and require it to adhere to 
some distorted interpretation of the language used by the 
Trial Court in determining the original child support 
award. Gloria then urges this Court to review the factors 
applied to child support in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 
713 (Utah App. 1990). Although Ostler was decided in 
1990, the trial on the Petition for Modification actually 
occurred in 1987. At that time, child support was 
controlled by a statute that required application of a 
number of specific factors before establishing the 
support award. As indicated by the Ostler Court at the 
time of the Appellate decision, that statute had been 
superseded by the 1989 statute (Section 78-45-7.14) and 
said statute has again been superseded by the current 
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statute (Section 78-45-7.2). The Ostler Court remanded 
the matter to the Trial Court to make a determination on 
each of the factors listed in the prior statute. In the 
case at bar, the Court was not required to utilize those 
factors as the current statute eliminated the factors and 
set a presumptive level of child support. 
Appellant has failed to provide any basis for her 
attack upon the award of child support set by the Trial 
Court. She has ignored the child support statute in its 
entirety. She has cited caselaw which does not support 
her contention and which was decided long before the 
adoption of the presumptive child support guidelines. She 
has failed to marshal all of the evidence that supported 
the Trial Court's Findings and then, despite such 
evidence, demonstrate that the Trial Court's Findings 
were clearly erroneous. Finally, she has omitted the only 
relevant case that has been decided since the adoption of 
the guidelines, namely, Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 
(Utah App. 1993). 
In Baker, the Court discussed the procedure for the 
application of the various sections of the child support 
statute. The case supports the procedure and methodology 
used by the Trial Court in the case at bar. It instructs 
the Trial Court to apply the presumptive child support 
guidelines and then, only where there is sufficient 
evidence to rebut the guidelines, should the Court 
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consider the factors outlined in Section 78-45-7(3) of 
the statute. A review of the Modification Court's 
Findings of Fact demonstrates that the Court addressed 
each factor contained in Section 78-45-7(3) (MFF 11 A-G). 
In reviewing an award of child support, the 
Appellate Courts accord substantial deference to the 
Trial Court's Findings and give it considerable latitude 
in fashioning an appropriate relief. Baker, supra at p. 
29; Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); 
Woodward, supra at p. 394. Additionally, the Appellate 
Courts do not disturb the Trial Court!s actions "unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or 
there has been an abuse of discretion." Baker, supra at 
p. 29; Woodward, supra at p. 394. In the case at bar, the 
Trial Court received evidence that there had been a 
substantial and material change of circumstance with 
respect to Gloria's ability to contribute to the support 
of her children. The Court then adopted the presumptive 
child support guidelines in express conformity with the 
child support statute. It received additional testimony 
about Gloria's ongoing expenses and entered specific 
Findings of Fact on each and every factor in Section 78-
45-7(3) U.C.A. Finally, the Court entered a child support 
award that was less than the amount specified in the 
guidelines in order to provide Gloria with some 
assistance in meeting her ongoing expenses. Since 
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Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any of the 
Findings of Fact or the methodology utilized by the Court 
were in error, this Court should affirm the child support 
award. 
Ill 
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEE 
ON APPEAL. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous 
appeal. Except in a first appeal of right 
in a criminal case, if the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award 
just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or 
by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of 
these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper. 
David requests that he be awarded his Court costs 
and attorney's fees on this appeal on the grounds that 
the appeal is frivolous and without merit and was 
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intended solely to delay payment of the child support 
award. This Court has made it clear that it has the 
authority to award costs and attorney's fees under 
appropriate circumstances. McGinty v. McGinty, Memo Dec, 
March 9, 1995 (Utah App. Case No. 930569-CA) (ADD E); 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); Eames v. 
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987). The recent substantial 
revisions of Rule 33 define a frivolous appeal as one 
that is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law 
or which is interposed for purposes of delay. In Eames, 
supra, the Supreme Court stated that a husband's appeal 
from a judgment relating to the distribution of marital 
property was frivolous where there was no basis for the 
argument presented and the evidence and law were mis-
characterized and misstated. 
It should be noted that the Modification Court 
awarded David one-half of his Court costs and attorney's 
fees incurred at the Modification Hearing. The Court 
provided an extensive analysis of its justification for 
that award (MFF 15; ADD B). 
Applying the standard for an award of attorney's 
fees as outlined above to the case at bar lends strong 
support for an award to David. David contends that Gloria 
filed the current appeal for the sole purpose of delaying 
payment to him. Since the time of the entry of the 
Court's ruling in this case, Gloria has failed to pay any 
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child support whatsoever. She has failed to pay any of 
the Court costs or attorney's fees awarded in by the 
Trial Court even though that issue was not appealed (ADD 
C). As indicated by David's Affidavit (ADD C), he has 
received no voluntary support whatsoever from Gloria for 
the benefit of the minor children since the time of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce on January 18, 1991. The 
Office of Recovery Services received $310.00 by 
garnishment of taxes but has been unwilling to pursue the 
child support obligation because of the pending appeal 
(ADD C). Additionally, Gloria has attempted to use the 
appeal to force a settlement of the child support at 
amounts less than awarded by the Trial Court (ADD C). 
As in McGinty and Eames, David contends that he 
should be granted his costs and attorney's fees because 
an analysis of Gloria's argument demonstrates that it was 
frivolous in nature. Appellant has failed to provide this 
Court with any rational basis for overturning the Trial 
Court's decision. She has not attempted to marshal all 
the evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings and 
then argue that, despite such evidence, the Trial Court's 
Findings were clearly erroneous or an abuse of 
discretion. She has failed to provide this Court with any 
legal theory that would give it grounds for overturning 
the Trial Court nor has she provided any caselaw that 
would support her position in this case. She has ignored 
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the applicable child support statute and the current 
caselaw that is determinative of this matter. Such "lack 
of meritorious issues" supports David's contention that 
the sole purpose for this appeal was to delay the 
imposition and collection of child support as directed by 
the Trial Court in this matter. 
From the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the appeal, it genuinely appears that the appeal exists 
for the sole purpose of thwarting David's attempts to 
gain contribution from Gloria for the support of the 
children. The current appeal raises no issue with respect 
to the payment of attorney's fees at the Trial Court 
level; however, they remain unpaid (ADD C). The current 
appeal raises no issue with respect to the payment of 
child care costs; however, they remain unpaid (ADD C). 
The current appeal raises no issue with respect to 
medical expenses incurred for the children; however, they 
remain unpaid (ADD C). Such a course of performance, 
coupled with the lack of any meritorious arguments, 
strongly suggests that the appeal exists solely to stall 
collection of child support. 
David requests that this Court find that the current 
appeal is without merit and was either frivolous or 
intended to cause delay. He requests that the Court award 
him costs and attorney's fees and establish a time for 
hearing pursuant to Rule 33 or, alternatively, remand to 
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the Trial Court for a determination of reasonable 
attorney's fees and Court costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Gloria has failed to apply the appropriate standard 
of review in the case at bar. She has failed to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the Trial Court's 
Findings and then demonstrate, despite such evidence, 
that the Trial Court's Findings were clearly erroneous. 
She attempts to argue a position for which no statutory 
or common law exists. She has ignored the current child 
support statute and the Baker case which explains the 
statute. She has failed to offer any viable legal 
argument which would attack the Trial Court's Findings or 
its determination or application of the law. In fact, the 
complete lack of merit of her arguments coupled with the 
circumstances surrounding the appeal strongly suggest 
that the appeal was filed for the sole purpose of 
delaying the enforcement of child support or coercing a 
reduction of same. As such, this Court should affirm the 
Trial Court's child support award and remand this matter 
to the Trial Court for a determination of Appellee's 
Court costs and attorney's fees on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May, 1994. 
JOANE^fKFPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, by delivering same on this 19th day of May, 
1995 to the following: 
Harry Caston 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
Suite 600 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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ADDENDUM A 
ORIGINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
FROM THE DIVORCE ACTION 
^ - • r ; ; K ^ ORIGINAL 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (810) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
GLORIA J. HIGHT, 
Defendant. \ 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 15978 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial before the Court on the 15th day of October, 1990, the 
Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge presiding; and, the 
Plaintiff appeared personally and with his counsel, JOANE 
PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant appeared personally and with 
her counsel JOHN E. SCHINDLER; and, the Court heard sworn 
testimony and received exhibits and announced findings from 
the bench and a ruling concerning the issue of custody of the 
minor children which ruling will now be repeated herein; and, 
the Court took the balance of the issues under advisement; 
and, each of the parties filed a Motion to Reconsider certain 
items contained in the Court's original Memorandum Decision 
and the rulings on said Motions are contained herein; and, the 
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Court having been fully advised in the premises now finds as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties hereto were actual and bona 
fide residents of Price, Carbon County, State of Utah, and had 
been for more than three (3) months immediately next prior to 
the commencement of this action. 
2. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant were 
married on the 17th day of January, 1981 at Orem, Utah County, 
state of Utah and have been husband and wife since that time. 
3. That there have been three (3) children born 
as the issue of this marriage, namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, 
born October 25, 1985; ADAM PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 
and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 (Twin boys). 
4. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences 
have occurred in the marital relationship that makes it 
impossible for the Plaintiff to continue in said relationship 
and, therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce terminating his marriage to the 
Defendant. In reviewing the file, the Court finds that the 
Defendant has no Answer or Counterclaim on file herein but 
that the parties entered an oral stipulation at the time of 
the Pretrial before the Court Commissioner whereby a general 
denial was entered on the record in Defendant's behalf and was 
deemed to constitute an Answer for the Defendant. 
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5. The Court finds that the Defendant earned a 
gross sum of EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE 
($8,963.00) DOLLARS to the first part of October, 1990 from 
her part-time employment with the United States Postal 
Department and, therefore, the Court finds that her average 
gross income is the sum of NINE HUNDRED NINETY ($990.00) 
DOLLARS per month for the year 1990. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is currently 
employed at Sears as a repairman and earns approximately TWO 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ($2,4 00.00) DOLLARS per month from said 
employment. 
7. With respect to the issue of custody, the Court 
entered the following Findings of Fact from the bench 
following the presentation of evidence on October 15, 1990: 
A. That the Plaintiff has been the primary 
caretaker of the three (3) minor children of the parties 
during much of the time since their respective births and 
particularly for the last year since the Defendant was 
hospitalized and subsequently separated from the Plaintiff. 
B. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has 
consistently demonstrated his willingness to place the needs 
of the children ahead of his own needs and provide a stable 
home environment for the children. 
C. The Court finds that the minor children 
are doing well in the Plaintiff's care and finds that it would 
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be in their best interest to maintain the stability which they 
have in the Plaintiff's environment. 
D. The Court finds that the Defendant has 
experienced ongoing emotional problems which have required 
numerous hospitalizations and which have required various 
medications. Although the Defendant appears to be 
demonstrating an improvement in her condition, the Court finds 
that the Plaintiff has never exhibited emotional problems or 
been required to take prescriptions which have mood altering 
effect. 
E. The Court is mindful of the various case 
law establishing the criteria to evaluate and determine a 
custody award. From the evidence the Court finds that it is 
in the best interests of the minor children of the parties 
that their care, custody and control be awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
8. The Court finds that it is in the best interest 
of the children that they have visitation with their mother 
and that said visitation should be on a regular basis without 
being overly disruptive of their normal home environment; 
therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant should be 
entitled to reasonable visitation with the minor children, at 
all reasonable times and places, including but not limited to 
the following: 
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A. The Defendant shall be entitled to take 
the children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays 
until 7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and 
B. The Defendant shall be entitled to visit 
with the children commencing at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 
7:30 p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed 
to be Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and 
Thanksgiving. She shall commence her holiday visits with 
Thanksgiving of 1990; and 
C. The Defendant shall be entitled to visit 
with the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 
9:30 a.m. on December 2 6th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on 
December 29th; and 
D. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to have 
the children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have 
the right to visit with the children every Mother's Day, 
irrespective of weekend visitations; and 
E. The Defendant shall be entitled to take 
the children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and 
two (2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer 
vacation period and the Defendant shall be allowed designate 
the dates for said summer visitation provided that she 
notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year. 
F. The Plaintiff should keep the Defendant 
advised of any major medical care required for the children 
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as well as keeping her advised of their progress in school and 
other significant aspects of the children's lives. 
9. The Court will not require the Defendant to pay 
child support to the Plaintiff to assist with the support of 
the children at this time because the Defendant will need all 
of her available income to take care of her living expenses 
as well as meet payments on the large debt obligations which 
she owes for her medical treatment and expenses. 
10. Based on the Plaintiff's present income and his 
obligation to solely support his children because of the 
Defendant's current limited earning capacity and debt level 
and because of the Court's Order requiring the Plaintiff to 
contribute to the payment of medical debts for the benefit of 
the Defendant, the Court will not order the Plaintiff to pay 
the Defendant any alimony. 
11. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff 
should be required to pay the debts listed on his financial 
statement, namely, the Hanover Mastercard (new account), the 
Hanover Mastercard (old account), the Discover card, the Sears 
card, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood mortgage 
debt as well as the miscellaneous medical and dental providers 
expenses incurred on behalf of the minor children. The 
Plaintiff is further ordered to pay one-half of all the 
outstanding medical bills incurred by the Defendant as shown 
on her Financial Declaration. The Defendant is also ordered 
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to pay one-half of all the outstanding medical bills incurred 
by her as designated in her Financial Declaration. 
12. Each of the parties is ordered to maintain 
medical, dental and optical insurance on the children if it 
is available through a group policy at their place of 
employment and each is ordered to pay one-half of all 
reasonable and necessary major medical, dental and/or optical 
expense incurred for and on behalf of the children which is 
not covered by a policy of insurance. The Plaintiff's 
insurance shall be designated as the primary carrier. 
13. The parties hereto have accumulated some real 
and personal property during this marriage and said property 
is awarded and distributed as follows: 
A. The Court finds that the Plaintiff will 
need the use of the marital residence in order to provide a 
home for the minor children and, therefore, the Court finds 
that said home should be awarded to the Plaintiff provided 
that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness thereon and holds 
the Defendant harmless therefrom. The Court specifically finds 
that the real property has an equity of approximately SIX 
THOUSAND ($6,000.00) DOLLARS. 
B. The Court finds that the 1980 Honda 
automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile have a combined 
value of approximately ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($1,900.00) 
DOLLARS and that those vehicles have traditionally been the 
Plaintiff's vehicles and that he should be awarded same. 
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C. The Court finds that the 1985 Ford Bronco 
has a value of approximately EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($8,500.00) DOLLARS and that said vehicle should be awarded 
to the Defendant. 
D. The Court finds that the parties had 
accumulated savings bonds during the marriage with a value of 
approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($3,500.00) DOLLARS 
and that the bonds have been turned over to the Defendant and 
should be awarded to her herein. 
E. The parties have previously divided the 
balance of their personal property between them and the Court 
finds that each party should be awarded those items in his or 
her possession as of the date of hearing, namely, October 15, 
1990 with the provision that the Plaintiff is ordered to 
furnish to the Defendant a working and useable washing 
machine. 
F. The Court finds that each of the parties 
have accumulated retirement benefits through the course of 
their respective employments and the Court finds that each of 
the parties should be awarded his or her respective retirement 
programs free and clear of any and all claims of the other 
party. 
14. The Court finds that each party has the 
capacity to pay his or her respective Court Costs and 
attorney's fees in this matter and that each party should be 
ordered to do so. 
8 
CG0103 
15. Each of the parties hereto submitted a request 
for the Court to reconsider part of the rulings in its 
Memorandum Decision, the Court has previously entered a 
Memorandum Decision on said Motions dated December 5, 1990 
which is incorporated herein, as follows: 
A. Plaintiff has moved the Court to 
reconsider the medical debt distribution as previously ordered 
by the Court based upon newly discovered evidence. It is the 
contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant incurred 
medical bills for elective treatment that may have not been 
covered by his insurance and, therefore, the Plaintiff should 
not be required to pay all of those elective medical bills. 
The Defendant has objected to any change and has denied the 
elective nature of the surgery and treatment. 
B. The Defendant has also asked the Court to 
reconsider the decision relative to the distribution of 
personal property. 
C. The matters presented in these Motions 
could have been aired at the time of the trial and the Court 
finds that said Motions should be denied with the exception 
that the Court will order that the Defendant should be given 
one-half of the family photos of the children and any other 
photos in the possession of the Plaintiff that are requested 
for the purposes of having copies of same made. 
D. The Court expressly finds that the 
personal property distribution made in the Court's original 
9 
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Memorandum Decision was made so that the children could take 
advantage of the majority, if not all, of the personal 
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of 
Fact now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from 
the Defendant. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the three (3) minor children of the parties, 
namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born October 25, 1985; ADAM 
PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born 
June 5, 1987 (Twin boys), subject to Defendant's rights to 
visit said children at all reasonable times and places, 
including but not limited to the following: 
A. The Defendant is entitled to take the 
children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays until 
7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and 
B. The Defendant is entitled to visit with 
the children commencincf at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 7:30 
p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed to be 
Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and Thanksgiving. She 
shall commence her holiday visits with Thanksgiving of 1990; 
and 
C. The Defendant is entitled to visit with 
the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 9:30 
10 
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a.m. on December 26th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on 
December 2 9th; and 
D. The Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have the 
right to visit with the children every Mother's Day, 
irrespective of weekend visitations; and 
E. The Defendant is entitled to take the 
children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and two 
(2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer 
vacation period and the Defendant will be allowed designate 
the dates for said summer visitation provided that she 
notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year. 
F. The Plaintiff shall keep the Defendant 
advised of any major medical care required for the children 
as well as keeping her advised of their progress in school and 
other significant aspects of the children's lives. 
3. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
real and personal property during this marriage and said 
property is awarded as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is awarded the home of the 
parties provided that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness 
thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Honda 
automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile. 
C. The Defendant is awarded the 1985 Ford 
Bronco. 
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D. The Defendant is awarded the savings bonds 
with a value of approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($3,500.00) DOLLARS. 
E. Each party is awarded those items of 
personal property in his or her possession as of October 15, 
1990. 
F. The Plaintiff is ordered to furnish the 
Defendant with a working and useable washing machine. 
G. Each party is awarded his or her 
respective retirement benefits, free and clear of all claims 
of the other party. 
4. No child support is awarded herein. 
5. No alimony is awarded herein. 
6. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
debts and obligations during the marriage and the Defendant 
has accumulated certain debts and obligations for her medical 
treatment following the separation of the parties, said debts 
and obligations are allocated as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay 
the outstanding debts and obligations as designated in his 
Financial Declaration, namely, Hanover Mastercard (new 
account), Hanover Mastercard (old account), the Discover Card, 
the Sears account, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood 
mortgage on the home together with various medical and dental 
bills accumulated on behalf of the minor children. 
12 
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B. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half 
of the medical expenses incurred by the Defendant as stated 
in her Financial Declaration, 
C. The Defendant is ordered to pay one-half 
of the medical expenses incurred by her as stated in her 
Financial Declaration. 
7. Each party is ordered to maintain medical, 
dental and optical insurance on the minor children of the 
parties if it is available through a group policy at their 
place of employment, as a benefit of their employment at 
little or no expense and each party is further ordered to pay 
one-half of any reasonable and necessary major medical, dental 
and/or optical expense incurred for and on behalf of the minor 
children which is not covered by a policy of insurance. The 
Plaintiffs insurance shall be designated as the primary 
carrier. 
8. Each party is ordered to pay his or her 
respective Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
9. Each parties7 Motion for Reconsideration is 
hereby denied. ^ 
DATED this //( day of J^nuaxy, 1991. ^ ^ ^ 
/ Di^ trict^ ourt'--4Judg:e 
APPROVED AS TO FORM £ CONTENT; 
JOHN ;E. SCHINDLER 
Attgi-ney for Defendant 
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (810) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
Vs. ] 
GLORIA J. HIGHT, 
Defendant. 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
i Civil No. 15978 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial before the Court on the 15th day of October, 1990, the 
Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge presiding; and, the 
Plaintiff appeared personally and with his counsel, JOANE 
PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant appeared personally and with 
her counsel JOHN E. SCHINDLER; and, the Court heard sworn 
testimony and received exhibits and announced findings from 
the bench and a ruling concerning the issue of custody of the 
minor children which ruling will now be repeated herein; and, 
the Court took the balance of the issues under advisement; 
and, each of the parties filed a Motion to Reconsider certain 
items contained in the Court's original Memorandum Decision 
and the rulings on said Motions are contained herein; and, the 
• i ' ' , 
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Court having been fully advised in the premises and having 
entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from 
the Defendant. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the three (3) minor children of the parties, 
namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born October 25, 1985; ADAM 
PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born 
June 5, 1987 (Twin boys), subject to Defendant's rights to 
visit said children at all reasonable times and places, 
including but not limited to the following: 
A. The Defendant is entitled to take the 
children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays until 
7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and 
B. The Defendant is entitled to visit with 
the children commencing at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 7:30 
p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed to be 
Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and Thanksgiving. She 
shall commence her holiday visits with Thanksgiving of 1990; 
and 
C. The Defendant is entitled to visit with 
the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 9:30 
2 
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a.m. on December 2 6th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on 
December 29th; and 
D. The Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have the 
right to visit with the children every Mother's Day, 
irrespective of weekend visitations; and 
E. The Defendant is entitled to take the 
children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and two 
(2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer 
vacation period and the Defendant will be allowed designate 
the dates for said summer visitation provided that she 
notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year. 
F. The Plaintiff is ordered to keep the 
Defendant advised of any major medical care required for the 
children as well as keeping her advised of their progress in 
school and other significant aspects of the children's lives. 
3. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
real and personal property during this marriage and said 
property is awarded as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is awarded the home of the 
parties provided that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness 
thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Honda 
automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile. 
C. The Defendant is awarded the 1985 Ford 
Bronco. 
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D. The Defendant is awarded the savings bonds 
with a value of approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($3,500.00) DOLLARS. 
E. Each party is awarded those items of 
personal property in his or her possession as of October 15, 
1990. 
F. The Plaintiff is ordered to furnish the 
Defendant with a working and useable washing machine. 
G. Each party is awarded his or her 
respective retirement benefits, free and clear of all claims 
of the other party. 
4. No child support is awarded herein. 
5. No alimony is awarded herein. 
6. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
debts and obligations during the marriage and the Defendant 
has accumulated certain debts and obligations for her medical 
treatment following the separation of the parties, said debts 
and obligations are allocated as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay 
the outstanding debts and obligations as designated in his 
Financial Declaration, namely, Hanover Mastercard (new 
account), Hanover Mastercard (old account), the Discover Card, 
the Sears account, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood 
mortgage on the home together with various medical and dental 
bills accumulated on behalf of the minor children. 
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B. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half 
of the medical expenses incurred by the Defendant as stated 
in her Financial Declaration. 
C. The Defendant is ordered to pay one-half 
of the medical expenses incurred by her as stated in her 
Financial Declaration. 
7. Each party is ordered to maintain medical, 
dental and optical insurance on the minor children of the 
parties if it is available through a group policy at their 
place of employment, as a benefit of their employment at 
little or no expense and each party is further ordered to pay 
one-half of any reasonable and necessary major medical, dental 
and/or optical expense incurred for and on behalf of the minor 
children which is not covered by a policy of insurance. The 
Plaintiff's insurance shall be designated as the primary 
carrier. 
8. Each party is ordered to pay his or her 
respective Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
9. Each parties' Motion for Reconsideration is 
APPROVED AS TO FORM • fit CONTENT: 
Mm 1 iLLll 
JOHN1 E . SCHINDLER 
At"torney fo r Defendant 
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (810) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
Vs. ] 
GLORIA J. HIGHT, 
Defendant. 
I AMENDED 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE | NUNC PRO TUNC 
i Civil No. 15978 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial before the Court on the 15th day of October, 1990, the 
Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge presiding; and, the 
Plaintiff appeared personally and with his counsel, JOANE 
PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant appeared personally and with 
her counsel JOHN E. SCHINDLER; and, the Court heard sworn 
testimony and received exhibits and announced findings from 
the bench and a ruling concerning the issue of custody of the 
minor children which ruling will now be repeated herein; and, 
the Court took the balance of the issues under advisement; 
and, each of the parties filed a Motion to Reconsider certain 
items contained in the Court's original Memorandum Decision 
and the rulings on said Motions are contained herein; and, the 
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Court having been fully advised in the premises and having 
entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from 
the Defendant. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the three (3) minor children of the parties, 
namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born October 25, 1985; ADAM 
PARKER HIGHT, bom June 5, 1987 and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born 
June 5, 1987 (Twin boys), subject to Defendants rights to 
visit said children at all reasonable times and places, 
including but not limited to the following: 
A. The Defendant is entitled to take the 
children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays until 
7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and 
B. The Defendant is entitled to visit with 
the children commencing at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 7:30 
p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed to be 
Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and Thanksgiving. She 
shall commence her holiday visits with Thanksgiving of 1990; 
and 
C. The Defendant is entitled to visit with 
the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 9:30 
2 
a.m. on December 2 6th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on 
December 29th; and 
D. The Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have the 
right to visit with the children every Mother's Day, 
irrespective of weekend visitations; and 
E. The Defendant is entitled to take the 
children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and two 
(2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer 
vacation period and the Defendant will be allowed designate 
the dates for said summer visitation provided that she 
notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year. 
F. The Plaintiff is ordered to keep the 
Defendant advised of any major medical care required for the 
children as well as keeping her advised of their progress in 
school and other significant aspects of the children's lives. 
3. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
real and personal property during this marriage and said 
property is awarded as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is awarded the home of the 
parties located at 286 North 100 West, Price, Utah, provided 
that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness thereon and holds 
the Defendant harmless therefrom. Said home is more 
particularly described as follows: 
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BEGINNING at a point 50 feet South of the 
Northwest Corner of Lot 2, Block 7, LOCAL 
SURVEY, a.k.a. TIDWELL'S SURVEY of a part 
of Section 16, Township 14 South, Range 
10 East, of Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
according to the official plat thereof; 
and running thence East 210 feet; thence 
South 59 7/8 feet; thence West 210 feet; 
thence North 59 7/8 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Together with all improvements and 
appurtenances thereunto appertaining. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Honda 
automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile. 
C. The Defendant is awarded the 1985 Ford 
Bronco. 
D. The Defendant is awarded the savings bonds 
with a value of approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($3,500.00) DOLLARS. 
E. Each party is awarded those items of 
personal property in his or her possession as of October 15, 
1990. 
F. The Plaintiff is ordered to furnish the 
Defendant with a working and useable washing machine. 
G. Each party is awarded his or her 
respective retirement benefits, free and clear of all claims 
of the other party. 
4. No child support is awarded herein. 
5. No alimony is awarded herein. 
6. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
debts and obligations during the marriage and the Defendant 
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has accumulated certain debts and obligations for her medical 
treatment following the separation of the parties, said debts 
and obligations are allocated as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay 
the outstanding debts and obligations as designated in his 
Financial Declaration, namely, Hanover Mastercard (new 
account) , Hanover Mastercard (old account) , the Discover Card, 
the Sears account, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood 
mortgage on the home together with various medical and dental 
bills accumulated on behalf of the minor children. 
B. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half 
of the medical expenses incurred by the Defendant as stated 
in her Financial Declaration. 
C. The Defendant is ordered to pay one-half 
of the medical expenses incurred by her as stated in her 
Financial Declaration. 
7. Each party is ordered to maintain medical, 
dental and optical insurance on the minor children of the 
parties if it is available through a group policy at their 
place of employment, as a benefit of their employment at 
little or no expense and each party is further ordered to pay 
one-half of any reasonable and necessary major medical, dental 
and/or optical expense incurred for and on behalf of the minor 
children which is not covered by a policy of insurance. The 
Plaintiff's insurance shall be designated as the primary 
carrier. 
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8. Each party is ordered to pay his or her 
respective Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
9. Each parties' Motion for Reconsideration is 
hereby denied. 
10. This Amended Decree of Divorce is entered 
herein Nunc Pro Tunc, and is retroactive back to the date of 
the entry of the original Decree of Divorce on January 18, 
1991. 
DATED this ^ 4 ^ d a y of /^^n££j^f , 1992. 
"BOYD BJJNNEI^ r
 r__ 
Di^fcirictyeourt Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
FROM MODIFICATION HEARING 
c , e n ORIGINAL 
NOV-U % 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Vs. ; 
GLORIA J. HIGHT, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
) PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
Civil No. 890715978 
1 Judge Bryner 
Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree came 
on regularly for hearing before the Court on the 2 6th day of 
August, 1994, the Honorable BRYCE K. BRYNER, District Court 
Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was personally present and 
represented by his attorney, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. Defendant was 
personally present and represented by her attorney, HARRY 
CASTON. The Court received sworn testimony from the parties, 
received certain exhibits into evidence and took the matter 
under advisement and now, being fully advised in the premises 
the Court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties hereto were divorced by Decree 
entered by the above-entitled Court on the 18th day of 
January, 1991. 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
2. Said Decree of Divorce awarded the Plaintiff 
father the legal care and custody of the three (3) minor 
children of the parties, namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born 
October 25, 1985; ADAM PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 and 
SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 (twin boys). 
3. At the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, the Defendant had average gross income of NINE 
HUNDRED NINETY ($990.00) DOLLARS per month. She now has 
monthly gross income of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-
EIGHT ($2,838.00) DOLLARS from her employment with the U.S. 
Post Office. 
4. All of Defendant's medical expenses which were 
encompassed and contemplated by paragraph 9 of the Findings 
of Fact have been discharged by Defendant's Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. 
5. The Court finds that an increase in income of 
ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT ($1,848.00) DOLLARS per 
month constitutes a material and substantial change in the 
conditions of the parties since the time of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is employed 
by Sears as a service technician and has monthly gross income 
Of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO ($2,532.00) DOLLARS. 
7. Based on the present income of the parties, the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines provide for child support to 
be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the sum of SIX 
2 
onnt.Q^ 
HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE ($689.00) DOLLARS per month. The only 
question remaining to the Court is whether good cause exists 
to deviate, at Defendant's request, from the guideline amount. 
8. In analyzing the Defendant's monthly expenses, 
the Court finds the following: 
A. The Defendant has no expenses out of the 
ordinary, or any types of expenses that have not already been 
taken into consideration by the guidelines, except for her 
medical expenses of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN 
DOLLARS THIRTY-NINE CENTS ($7,867.39). (The total on exhibit 
9 should be corrected to $7,867.39 as Gold Cross Ambulance has 
been paid off, Pioneer Valley Hospital has been reduced by 
$50.00, and 80% of the bills from Dr. Reyser and Consultant 
Radiologist will be paid by the insurance company according 
to the testimony of the Defendant. The Court also notes that 
the bill from University Hospital for $5,543.71 has been 
submitted to the Defendants insurance company but it has not 
yet been determined whether payment will be made) . She has had 
certain home repairs which necessitated a $4,000.00 loan but 
the monthly payment thereon of $260.00 is not so out of 
proportion to her income that it would, by itself, justify a 
deviation from the guidelines. 
B. In arriving at the above findings, the 
Court has considered that the Defendant has net income of 
EIGHT HUNDRED ($800.00) DOLLARS every two (2) weeks or ONE 
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY ($1,720.00) DOLLARS for a 4.3 
3 
C001S4 
work week month. She has expenses of TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-FIVE CENTS ($2,102.25) (Exhibit No. 9) and 
a TWENTY ($20.00) DOLLAR payment per month to Levitz and a 
payment to Signet on the balance of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 
($1,200.00) DOLLARS on which no monthly payment was furnished. 
C. The Defendant presented testimony that she 
has average medical expenses each month which are not covered 
by insurance in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED NINE ($709.00) 
DOLLARS as a result of her schizo-affective bi-polar disorder. 
Defendant further stated that this amount was computed by 
adding up the face amount of checks she has written in the 
past year but Defendant did not provide any documentation to 
support her claim. 
9. The Court finds that Defendant's medical 
expenses are extraordinary in light of her psychological 
condition and that it would be unjust to require her to pay 
the entire SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE ($689.00) DOLLARS per month 
as child support. Accordingly, the Court also finds that the 
presumption of correctness of the guideline amount has been 
sufficiently rebutted and that Defendant should be required 
to pay child support in the amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE 
($175.00) DOLLARS per child per month for a total of FIVE 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS in child support, 
commencing with the month of August, 1994. 
10. The Court recognizes that the Petition to 
Modify was filed in February of 1994 but also takes into 
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consideration the fact that the Defendant has no savings and 
it would be impractical to require her to pay the sum of FIVE 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS per month since January 
of 1994. 
11. The FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS 
per month in child support was determined after a 
consideration of the factors stated below as required by 
Section 78-45-7: 
A. The standard of living and situation of 
both parties: The Court finds that the Defendant is living in 
a mobile home which she purchased in November of 1993 for 
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($3,500.00) DOLLARS. Substantial 
repairs have had to be made on the home which required a FOUR 
THOUSAND ($4,000.00) DOLLAR loan. The Defendant is renting the 
lot on which the mobile home is situated. The Defendant has 
an automobile which is paid for and the Court, therefore, 
concludes that she is living a rather austere life style but 
one which is adequate. The has been supporting himself and his 
three (3) children on his income of approximately TWO THOUSAND 
FIVE HUNDRED ($2,500.00) DOLLARS per month. The Court finds 
that his standard of living could not be much different from 
that of the Defendant who has actually had more disposable 
income than he in the past. 
B. Relative wealth and income of each party: 
Each party has regular employment with the Plaintiff earning 
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO ($2,532.00) DOLLARS per 
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month gross income and the Defendant earning TWO THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT ($2,838.00) DOLLARS per month gross 
income. Neither party has any substantial savings accounts nor 
does either party have any substantial material assets. 
C. Ability of the Defendant to earn: The 
Defendant is employed by the U.S. Postal Service where she 
earned FORTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($41,500.00) DOLLARS 
in 1993 which included overtime. However, at the present time, 
she is earning SIXTEEN DOLLARS FIFTY CENTS ($16.50) per hour. 
Her employment is secure even though she has been hospitalized 
several times in 1991 and in 1994. She has received full pay 
during those hospitalizations. 
D. Ability of the Plaintiff to earn: The 
Plaintiff is employed by Sears as a service technician. His 
employment is secure and should continue for the foreseeable 
future. He currently gross income of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
THIRTY-TWO ($2,532.00) DOLLARS per month. 
E. Needs of the parties and the children: The 
Plaintiff father has the legal custody of the three (3) minor 
children and places them in daycare when they are not in 
school while he is at work. His reasonable needs and the needs 
of the children exceed his income and he is, therefore, in 
need of assistance with child support. The Defendant has needs 
each month of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT 
($1,938.00) DOLLARS ($2,122.00 from Exhibit 9 and $709.00 in 
child support which has been reduced to $525.00). However, the 
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Court also finds that the maintenance costs and entertainment 
costs appear to be excessive and could be reduced. 
F. The age of the parties: No testimony was 
presented with regard to the age of the parties but their 
appearance would indicate to the Court that each party is in 
their late twenties or early thirties, 
G. Neither party has any responsibility for 
the support of others not contemplated by the facts of this 
case. 
12. The Defendant should also be required to pay 
to the Plaintiff one-half of the actually incurred work 
related child care costs as provided by Section 78-45-7.16(1), 
Utah Code Annotated. The Court finds that the actually 
incurred child care costs are the sum of $400.00 per month at 
the current time. 
13. The Defendant shall pay one-half of the out-
of-pocket health insurance premiums for the children. The 
Court finds that the premium paid for the children each month 
out-of-pocket by the Plaintiff is EIGHTY ($80.00) DOLLARS and 
the Defendant should be required to pay one-half of that 
amount which is the sum of FORTY ($40.00) DOLLARS pursuant to 
Section 78-45-7.15(3), Utah Code Annotated. 
14. The Court finds that an Order to Withhold and 
Deliver should be immediately implemented pursuant to Title 
62A Chapter 11, Parts IV and V, Utah Code Annotated. 
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15. Plaintiff has requested assistance in paying 
his attorney fee. Plaintiff's attorney proffered that she has 
expended 8 3/4 hours on this case at the rate of ONE HUNDRED 
($100.00) DOLLARS per hour for a total of EIGHT HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-FIVE ($875.00) DOLLARS. In determining whether to 
award an attorney's fee, the Court must consider the financial 
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. The 
Court may also consider, among other factors, the difficulty 
of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, and 
the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount 
involved in the case and the result obtained and the expertise 
and experience of the attorneys involved. The Court finds, in 
this matter, that the Plaintiff has need of assistance in 
paying his fees; however, the Court recognizes that the 
Defendant, because of her extraordinary medical expenses, can 
be expected to pay only a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's 
fees in light of the fact that the Plaintiff has prevailed in 
this matter. The Court finds that the amount requested is 
reasonable in view of the income of the parties and that the 
result attained, which was necessary to secure the rights of 
the minor children in their child support has been in the best 
interests of said children and further finds that the 
Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the EIGHT HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-FIVE ($875.00) DOLLARS incurred in pursuing this case, 
8 
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namely, the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS FIFTY 
CENTS ($437.50). The Defendant is ordered to pay said sum to 
the Plaintiff at the rate of FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS per month 
commencing with the month of September, 1994 and continuing 
each and every month thereafter until said sum has been fully 
paid. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of 
Fact now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A substantial and material change of 
circumstances has occurred with respect to the earning 
capacities of the parties since the time of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and said change justifies a modification of 
the Decree of Divorce with respect to child support and other 
issues associated therewith. 
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff child support in the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE 
($175.00) DOLLARS per child per month for a total of FIVE 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS per month together with 
one-half of the actually incurred child care costs which is 
currently the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS per month 
together with one-half of the actually incurred insurance 
premiums for medical insurance for the children which is the 
sum of FORTY ($40.00) DOLLARS per month for a total of SEVEN 
HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE ($765.00) DOLLARS per month for and as 
child support pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support 
9 
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Guidelines and the attached worksheet attached hereto as 
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. Said child 
support shall commence with the month of August, 1994 and 
shall continue each and every month thereafter until further 
order of this Court. 
3. In the event that the Plaintiff experiences any 
change in the actually incurred child care expense for his 
employment or in the actually incurred medical premiums paid 
by him for the benefit of the minor children, he shall 
immediately notify the Defendant and any third party agency 
such as the Office of Recovery Services, of said change. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS FIFTY 
CENTS ($437.50) for and as a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's 
fees in this matter. Defendant shall pay said sum to the 
Plaintiff at the rate of FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS per month 
commencing with the month of September, 1994 and continuing 
each and every month thereafter until said sum has been fully 
paid. ^6 
DATED this / day of Oe^fetniibtf-r, 1994. 
BRYCE y. BRYN 
District Court Jud 
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Attorney Bar No. 3445 
IN THE Seventh DISTRICT COURT 
Carbon COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT 
V S . 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORK, 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERN! 
GLORIA J . HIGHT, C i v i l N o . 8907159.78 
j 1. Enter the £ of natural and adopted children of this 
j|mccr.er and father for wncm support is _to be awarded. 
2a. Inter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
(income. Refer to Instructions for definition of 
I income. 
j 2b. Inter previously ordered alimony that is actually 
1 caid. (So*net enter aiimonv ordered for this case). 
i 
1 2c. Inter previously ordered child support. (Do not 
|| enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1). 
| 2d. OPTIONAL; Inter the amount from Line 12 of the 
IIChildren in Present Heme Worksheet for either parent. 
1 2. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the 
[Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes. 
j of cniidren in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the 
S|Hase Ccmoir.ec Support Qbiicaticn. Inter it here. 
IE. livice eacn parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 
|2 bv the COMBINED adjusted monthly cross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line S for each parent to obtain 
|eacn parent's share of the 3ase Support Obligation. 
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7 . 3ASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Br ing down t h e amount i n L i n e 6 
f o r t h e O b l i g o r Parent or e n t e r t h e amount frcra t h e Low Income 
T a b l e . 
3. 
a
 0 
10, 
Which parent is the obligor? ( XJ Mother ( ) Father 
Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in Line 7? 
(X) Yes Y ) No If YES, enter the amount ordered: $175 per child total $525 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( } excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) aosence of need of the custodial parent 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Vs. ] 
GLORIA J. HIGHT, 
Defendant. 
) ORDER ON PETITION FOR | MODIFICATION 
Civil No. 890715978 
1 Judge Bryner 
Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree came 
on regularly for hearing before the Court on the 26th day of 
August, 1994, the Honorable BRYCE K. BRYNER, District Court 
Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was personally present and 
represented by his attorney, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. Defendant was 
personally present and represented by her attorney, HARRY 
CASTON. The Court received sworn testimony from the parties, 
received certain exhibits into evidence and took the matter 
under advisement and now, being fully advised in the premises 
and the Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
ORIGINAL 
fir rf ?f u 
NOV-* % 
000204 
1. A substantial and material change of 
circumstances has occurred with respect to the earning 
capacities of the parties since the time of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and said change justifies a modification of 
the Decree of Divorce with respect to child support and other 
issues associated therewith. 
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff child support in the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE 
($175.00) DOLLARS per child per month for a total of FIVE 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS per month together with 
one-half of the actually incurred child care costs which is 
currently the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS per month 
together with one-half of the actually incurred insurance 
premiums for medical insurance for the children which is the 
sum of FORTY ($40.00) DOLLARS per month for a total of SEVEN 
HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE ($765.00) DOLLARS per month for and as 
child support pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines and the attached worksheet attached hereto as 
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. Said child 
support shall commence with the month of August, 1994 and 
shall continue each and every month thereafter until further 
order of this Court. 
3. In the event that the Plaintiff experiences any 
change in the actually incurred child care expense for his 
employment or in the actually incurred medical premiums paid 
by him for the benefit of the minor children, he shall 
2 
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immediately notify the Defendant and any third party agency 
such as the Office of Recovery Services, of said change. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS FIFTY 
CENTS ($437.50) for and as a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's 
fees in this matter. Defendant shall pay said sum to the 
Plaintiff at the rate of FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS per month 
commencing with the month of September, 1994 and continuing 
each and every month thereafter until said sum has been fully 
paid. 
DATED this 7 day of SPdfefflPSI / 1994 
000206 
Attorney Bar No. 3445 
IN THE Seventh 
Carbon 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HIGHT 
V S . 
GLORIA J . HIGHT, 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS: 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNIr 
C i v i l No. 8 9 0 7 1 5 9 7 8 
11. Enter the £ of natural and adopted children of this || mother and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of 
I  income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually 
I  paid. (Do net enter alimony ordered for this easel. 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not 
(I enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1). 
| 2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the ||Children in Present Heme Worksheet for either parent. 
| 2. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the 
(Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number 
cf cnildren in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the |3ase Comoined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line |2 by -he COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain 
[eacn parent's share of the 3ase Support Obligation. 
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7 . 3ASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: 3 r i n g down t h e amount i n L i n e 6 
f o r t h e O b l i g o r P a r e n t o r e n t e r t h e amount from t h e Low Income 
T a b l e . 
a. 
Q
 # 
10. 
Which p a r e n t i s t h e ob l igo r? ( X) Mother ( ) Fa the r 
I s t h e suppor t award ordered d i f f e r e n t from t h e g u i d e l i n e amount i n Line 7? 
(X) Yes X ) X° -* - - s ' e " l e r t h e amount o r d e r e d : $175 p e r c h i l d t o t a l $525 
What were t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d by t h e Court fo r t h e d e v i a t i o n ? 
( ) p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t 
( ) e x c e s s i v e d e b t s of the marr iage 
( ) aosence of need of the c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t 
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INSURANCE PREMIUM AND CHILD CARE ADJUSTMENT 
WORKSHEET 
INSURANCE ADJUSTMENT 
L'se this section of the worksheet to calculate how the children's 
.T.eciical insurance premium expenses change the amount the obligor pays to 
-he ooliaee. 
If the OBLIGCR parent i s ordered to maintain medical insurance for the 
ch i ld ren comnlete t h i s s ec t ion . 
;|A. Enter the amount of the children's portion of the medical 
' insurance oremium actually oaid bv the obiioor. 
il : — : : : . 1 3. Multiply Line A. by .30 to oDtam tne obligee's share of the 
I oremium. 
L_r _ , ._._______________ C Subtract the amount in line 3. from the base cnild.. support award 
to obtain the amount the obligor pays to the obligee for the months 
tne premium is actually paid. Enter the result here. 
$ ~ ~ i || 
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:he OBLIGEE parent i s ordered to maintain medicai insurance for the 
.dren complete t h i s sec t ion . 
i ter tne amount the c h i l d r e n ' s t o r t i o n of tne medical 
insurance oremium actuai iv oaid bv the o b l i c e e . 80 
Multiply L 
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ine D. bv .30 to obtain the obligor's share of the 
40 
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.n line 2. to the base child support award to 
:he obligor pays to the obligee for the months the 
.• oaid. Inter the result here. 729 
Mc credit or offset is allowed unless the premium is actually paid. If 
the premium is net paid, the obligor must pay the amount of the case 
child support award. 
CHILD CARE ADJUSTMENT 
Use this section of the worksheet to calculate how the children's child 
care exoenses chance the amount the obliaor oavs to the oblicee. 
G. Inter the average amount of the monthly child care expense 
actuaiiv oaid bv the oblicee. 400 
H. Multiply Line G. by .30 to obtain the obligor's share of the child 
care expense. Inter the result here. Complete box I, J, or K. below. 200 
I. If neither parent is maintaining insurance, add the amount in Line 
H. to the base child support award to obtain the amount the obligor 
pays to the obligee for the months the child care expense is 
incurred. Inter the resuit here. 
the ooliccr is maintaining insurance, add the amount m Line H. 
to tne amount m line C. to obtain the amount 
coiigee for the months 
resuit here. 
he cnna care exoense 
:he obligor pays to the 
.s incurred. Inter the 
K. If tne coiicee .s maintaining insurance, add the amount in Line H. 
to :ne amount m line F. to obtain the amount the obligor pays to the 
cbiigee for the montns the child care expense is incurred. Inter the 
resuit nere. 
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ADDENDUM C 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID HIGHT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID HIGHT : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
GLORIA J. HIGHT : 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID HIGHT 
: Case No. 940721-CA 
: Priority 15 
I, David Hight, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I was Plaintiff in the divorce action, 
Petitioner in the modification procedure and Appellee in 
the current matter. 
2. At all times since the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce on January 18, 1991, I have been the sole 
custodian of our three (3) children Amanda Ashley Hight, 
born October 25, 1985; Adam Parker Hight, born June 5, 
1987; and Shawn David Hight, born June 5, 1987. 
3. On February 9, 1994 I filed the Petition for 
Modification concerning child support because I 
discovered that my ex-wife, Gloria Hight, had been fully 
re-employed as a postal worker at the United States Post 
Office for over a year. 
4. Although she had been fully employed at an 
income over $40,000.00, Gloria had failed to provide any 
child support whatsoever for our children nor had she 
advised me of her ability to do so. 
5. Following the entry of the Order on Petition 
for Modification, Gloria has failed to pay any of the 
child support ordered by the Court. She has additionally 
failed to provide any of the attorney's fees awarded to 
me in the modification proceeding. She has also failed to 
pay any of the child care costs or any of the medical 
expenses as required by the Order of Modification or the 
Decree of Divorce, respectively. 
6. After the filing of the Petition for 
Modification, Gloria made one (1) voluntary $10.00 
payment of child support. Office of Recovery Services 
made one (1) garnishment of Gloria's taxes for $300.00 
after the commencement of the Petition for Modification. 
Since the filing of the appeal, the Office of Recovery 
Services has advised me that they will not attempt any 
further child support collection activities until the 
appeal is resolved. 
7. Following the entry of the Court's Order on 
Petition for Modification on November 4, 1995, Gloria 
called me at 6:38 p.m. on November 16, 1995. She informed 
me that she would appeal this matter before she would pay 
the child support or attorney's fees. She advised me that 
she would voluntarily agree to pay $100.00 per child per 
month and if that wasn't enough she v/ould just quit her 
employment and never pay anything and appeal the case. I 
took notes on the conversation and believe she meant what 
she said. 
2 
8. My income has increased by only $125.00 per 
month since the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce in 1991. The needs of the minor children have 
increased substantially due to the increase in their ages 
and the cost of living. 
9. The minor children and I are really having a 
financial struggle to meet the costs and attorney's fees 
of this appeal. My attorney has advanced all of the costs 
on this case and I am attempting to make a modest monthly 
payment toward the attorney's fees; however, this appeal 
is causing a substantial hardship to the children as it 
is expending monies that we do not have available to us. 
10. In my opinion, Gloria knows the hardship that 
the children and I are experiencing as a result of this 
appeal and it was the basis of her threat to pursue the 
appeal if I would not accept her terms and conditions. 
WHEREFORE, Affiant prays that the Court determine 
that Appellant's appeal is without merit and has been 
filed for the sole purpose of causing a delay in the 
collection of Appellant's child support obligations and 
causing serious financial distress to the Affiant. 
Affiant asks that this Court remand this matter to the 
Trial Court for an award of Affiant's Court costs and 
attorney's fees. 
3 
J 
DATED this 1% day of May, 1995. 
May, 1995, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
ur yUOTARY^ PUBLIC 
Residing At: 
My Commission Expires; fy&fis* ^ ^ 
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ADDENDUM D 
SECTION 78-45-1 ET. SEQ., 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 
375 JUDICIAL CODE 78-45-2 
78-44-39. Duties under prior law — Property to 
be included in initial report. 
(1) This chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty 
to report, pay, or deliver property arising before July 
1, 1983. Such holder who fails to comply before that 
date is subject to the applicable enforcement and pen-
alty provisions in existence at that time and those 
provisions are continued in effect for the purpose of 
this subsection, subject to Subsection 78-44-30(2). 
(2) The initial report to be filed under this chapter 
for property that was not required to be reported be-
fore July 1, 1983, but which is subject to this chapter 
shall include all items of property that would have 
been presumed abandoned during the ten-year period 
prior to July 1, 1983. as if this chapter had been in 
effect during that period. 1983 
78-44-40. Applicat ion and construct ion of chap-
ter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the 
law with respect to the subject of this chapter among 
states enacting it. 1983 
CHAPTER 45 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR S U P P O R T 
ACT 
Section 
78-45-1. Short title. 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
78-45-4. Duty of woman. 
78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support step-
child — Effect of termination of 
marriage or common law relation-
ship. 
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has pri-
mary obligation of support r— Right 
of stepparent to recover support. 
78-45-4.3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to 
support. 
78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence 
or residence of obligee. 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support 
— Rebuttable guidelines. 
78-45-7.1. Medical expenses of dependent chil-
dren — Assigning responsibility for 
payment — Insurance coverage — 
Income withholding. 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipu-
lation. 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income 
used. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Im-
puted income. 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation 
calculations. 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership 
and functions. 
78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obliga-
tion table and low income table. 
Section 
78-45-7.15. 
78-45-7.16. 
78-45-7.17. 
78-45-7.18. 
78-45-7.19. 
78-45-7.20. 
78-45-7.21. 
78-45-8. 
78-45-9. 
78-45-9.1. 
78-45-9.2. 
78-45-10. 
78-45-11. 
78-45-12. 
78-45-13. 
Medical expenses. 
Child care expenses — Expenses not 
incurred. 
Child care costs. 
Limitation on amount of support or-
dered. 
Determination of parental liability. 
Accountability of support provided to 
benefit child — Accounting. 
Award of tax exemption for dependent 
children. 
Continuing jurisdiction. 
Enforcement of right of support. 
Repealed. 
County attorney to assist obligee. 
Appeals. 
Husband and wife privileged commu-
nication inapplicable — Compe-
tency of spouses. 
Rights are in addition to those pres-
ently existing. 
Interpretation and construction. 
78-45-1. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act. 1957 
78-45-2. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income cal-
culated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1). 
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office 
of Recovery Services. 
(3) "Base child support award" means the 
award that may be ordered and is calculated 
using the guidelines before additions for medical 
expenses and work-related child care costs. 
(4) "Base combined child support obligation ta-
ble," "child support table," "base child support 
obligation table," "low income table," or "table" 
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-
7.14. 
(5) "Child" means a son or daughter younger 
than 18 years of age and a son or daughter of any 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living 
and is without sufficient means. 
(6) "Court" means the district court, juvenile 
court, or administrative agency which may enter 
a child support order as defined in Section 
62A-11-401. 
(7) "Earnings" means compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denomi-
nated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic pay-
ment pursuant to pension or retirement pro-
grams, or insurance policies of any type. Earn-
ings specifically includes all gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined, in-
cluding profit gained through sale or conversion 
of capital assets. 
(8) "Guidelines" means the child support 
guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2 through 78-45-
7.21. 
(9) "IV-D" means Title IV of the Social Secu-
rity Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq. 
(10) "Joint physical custody" means the child 
stays with each parent overnight for more than 
25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support. 
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(11) "Medical expenses" means health and 
dental expenses and related insurance costs. 
(12) "Obligee" means any person to whom a 
duty of support is owed. 
(13) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty 
of support. 
(14) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices within the Department of Human Services. 
(15) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an 
adoptive parent, or a stepparent. 
(16) "Split custody" means that each parent 
has physical custody of at least one of the chil-
dren. 
(17) "State" includes any state, territory, or 
possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. 
(18) "Stepchild" means any child having a 
stepparent. 
(19) "Stepparent" means a person ceremoni-
ally married to a child's natural or adoptive cus-
todial parent who is not the child's natural or 
adoptive parent or a person living with the natu-
ral or adoptive parent as a common law spouse, 
whose common law marriage was entered into in 
this state under Section 30-1-4.5 or in any other 
state which recognizes the validity of common 
law marriages. 
(20) "Work-related child care costs" means 
reasonable child care costs for up to a full-time 
work week or training schedule as necessitated 
by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent under Section 78-45-7.17. 
(21) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid 
in calculating the base child support award. 1994 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
Every father shall support his child; and every man 
shall support his wife when she is in need. - 1991 
78-45-4. D u t y of w o m a n . 
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall 
support her husband when he is in need. 1957 
78-45-4.1. Duty of s tepparent to support step-
chi ld — Effect of terminat ion of mar-
riage or common law relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to 
support a child. Provided, however, that upon the ter-
mination of the marriage or common law relationship 
between the stepparent and the child's natural or 
adoptive parent the support obligation shall termi-
nate. 1980 
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has pri-
mary obligation of support — Right of 
stepparent to recover support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the 
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary obli-
gation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the 
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the 
natural or adoptive parent as any other obligee. 1979 
78-45-4.3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to 
support. 
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an 
adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child has 
become a ward of the state is not relieved of the pri-
mary obligation to support that child until he reaches 
the age of majority. 1983 
78-45-5. Duty of obl igor regard le s s of presence 
or residence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the 
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of the 
presence or residence of the obligee. 1957 
78-45-6. District court jurisdict ion. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all pro-
ceedings brought under this act. 1957 
78-45-7. Determinat ion of a m o u n t of support — 
Rebuttable guidelines. 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
amount granted by prior court order unless there 
has been a material change of circumstance on 
the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipu-
lated provision for the automatic adjustment for 
prospective support, the prospective support shall 
be the amount as stated in the order, without a 
showing of a material change of circumstances, if 
the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or 
exceeds the base child support award re-
quired by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as 
a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction 
of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court de-
termining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child 
support using the guidelines before an order award-
ing child support or modifying an existing award may 
be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut 
the guidelines, the court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the par-
ties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and 
the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the 
obligee for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court 
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon 
the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in 
this chapter. 1994 
78-45-7.1. Medical e x p e n s e s of d e p e n d e n t chil-
dren — Assigning responsibility for 
payment — Insurance coverage — In-
come withholding. 
The court shall include the following in its order: 
( D a provision assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical ex-
penses for the dependent children; 
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate insurance for the 
medical expenses of dependent children, if cover-
age is or becomes available at a reasonable cost; 
(3) provisions* for income withholding, in ac-
cordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 
5; and 
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(4) with regard to child support orders issued 
or modified on or after January 1, 1994, that are 
subject to income withholding, an order assessing 
against the obligor an additional $7 per month 
check processing fee to be included in the amount 
withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices within the Department of Human Services 
for the purposes of income withholding in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
1994 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or adminis-
trative order establishing or modifying an award of 
child support entered on or after July 1. 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be ap-
plied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing 
or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the pro-
visions and considerations required by the guide-
lines, the award amounts resulting from the ap-
plication of the guidelines, and the use of 
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are 
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the 
record supporting the conclusion that complying with 
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be 
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a 
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either par-
ent who live in the home of that parent and are 
not children in common to both parties may at 
the option of either party be taken into account 
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a 
child support award, as provided in Subsection 
(5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared 
that compute the obligations of the respective 
parents for the additional children. The obliga-
tions shall then be subtracted from the appropri-
ate parent's income before determining the 
award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other 
than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be 
applied to justify a decrease in the award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment 
of the guidelines and any subsequent change in the 
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modification 
or adjustment of a court order, if there is a difference 
of a t least 25% between the existing order and the 
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., 
the office may request modification, in accordance 
with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 
1988, Public Law 100-485, no more often than once 
every three years . 1994 
78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentation — Stip-
ulat ion. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the 
moving par ty shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Sub-
section 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or 
not the amount of child support requested is con-
sistent with the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required un-
der Subsection (1) is not available, a verified rep-
resentation of the defaulting party's income by 
the moving party, based on the best evidence 
available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and 
may only be offered after a copy has been pro-
vided to the defaulting party in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chap-
ter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in an ad-
ministrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the mov-
ing parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iii) a written statement indicating 
whether or not the amount of child support 
requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guide-
lines shall be used to review the adequacy of a 
child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or 
combined child support and alimony is adequate 
under the guidelines if the stipulated child sup-
port amount or combined amount equals or ex-
ceeds the base child support award required by 
the guidelines. 1994 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income 
used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating 
each parent 's share of the base combined child sup-
port obligation. Only income of the natural or adop-
tive parents of the child may be used to determine the 
award under these guidelines. 1994 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Im-
puted income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" in-
cludes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, in-
cluding nonearned sources, except under Subsec-
tion (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, 
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, 
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, inter-
est, trust income, alimony from previous mar-
riages, annuities, capital gains, social security 
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, disability insurance 
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" 
government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited 
to the equivalent of one full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy 
program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits 
received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or oper-
ation of a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-
employment or business operation from gross re-
ceipts. The income and expenses from self-em-
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ployment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award Only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level mav be deducted from gross receipts 
(b) Gross income determined under this sub-
section mav differ from the amount of business 
income determined for tax purposes 
(5) (a) When possible gross income should first be 
computed on an annual basis and then recalcu-
lated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of 
current income Each parent shall provide year-
to-date pa\ stuDs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the 
most recent \ ear unless the court finds the verifi-
cation is not reasonablv available Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of 
Emplovment Secuntv ma\ be substituted for pay 
stubs, emplo\er statements and income tax re-
turns 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be 
used to determine whether an underemployment 
or overemplovment situation exists 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the 
parent under Subsection (7) 
(7) (a) Income mav not be imputed to a parent un-
less the parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is \oluntarih unemployed or underem-
ploved 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the in-
come shall be based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as denved from work his-
tory occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds m 
the communitv 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, in-
come shall be imputed at least at the federal min-
imum wage for a 40-hour work week To impute 
a greater income the judge in a judicial proceed-
ing or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiarv basis for the imputation 
(d) Income mav not be imputed if any of the 
following conditions exist 
d) the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn, 
(n) a parent is phvsically or mentally dis-
abled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage 
(in) a parent is engaged in career or occu-
pational training to establish basic job skills, 
or 
dv) unusual emotional or physical needs 
of a child require the custodial parent s pres-
ence in the home 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings 
of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income 
(b) Social Secuntv benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited 
as child support to the parent upon whose earn-
ing record it is based, by crediting the amount 
against the potential obligation of that parent 
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
ered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case 1994 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in-
come" is the amount calculated by subtracting from 
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the 
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing In establishing alimony, the court shall consider 
that in determining the child support, the guidelines 
do not provide a deduction from gross income for ali-
mony 1989 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be 
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted 
gross incomes, unless the low income table is applica-
ble 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and 
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in 
cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is 
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award 
shall be determined as follows 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross income 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross in-
come of the obligor is between $650 and $1,050, the 
base child support award shall be the lesser of the 
amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) 
and the amount calculated using the low income ta-
ble 
(4) The base combined child support obligation ta-
ble provides combined child support obligations for up 
to six children For more than six children, additional 
amounts may be added to the base child support obli-
gation shown Unless rebutted by Subsection 
78-45-7 2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less 
than the amount which would be ordered for up to six 
children 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the ob-
ligor is $649 or less, the court or administrative 
agency shall determine the amount of the child sup-
port obligation en a case-by-case basis, but the base 
child support award shall not be less than $20 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support 
amount for the total number of children, not an 
amount per child 1994 
78-45-7.8. SplH custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of split custody, the base child support 
award shall be determined as follows 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table Allocate a portion of the 
calculated amount between the parents in pro-
portion to the number of children for whom each 
parent has physical custody The amounts so cal-
culated are a tentative base child support obliga-
tion due each parent from the other parent for 
support of the child or children for whom each 
parent has physical custody 
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(2) Multiply the tentative base child support 
obligation due each parent by the percentage 
that the other parent's adjusted gross income 
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income 
of both parents. 
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection 
(2) from the larger amount to determine the base 
child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 1994 
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation 
calculations. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child 
support award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the base combined child sup-
port obligation by each parent's percentage of 
combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so 
calculated are a tentative base child support obli-
gation due from each parent for support of the 
children. 
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child 
support obligation by the percentage of time the 
children spend with the other parent to deter-
mine each parent's tentative obligation to the 
other parent. 
(4) Calculate the base child support award to 
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser 
amount calculated in Subsection (3) from the 
larger amount. 
(5) The parent determined to be the obligor in 
Subsection (4) shall pay the amount calculated in 
Subsection (4) when the obligee has physical cus-
tody. 1994 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has 
graduated from high school during the child's normal 
and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs 
later, the base child support award is automatically 
reduced to reflect the lower base combined child sup-
port obligation shown in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless other-
wise provided in the child support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child 
amount derived from the base child support award 
originally ordered. 1994 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the 
base child support award be reduced by 50% for each 
child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by 
written agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any 
30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipi-
ent of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any 
agreement by the parties for reduction of child sup-
port during extended visitation shall be approved by 
the administrative agency. However, normal visita-
tion and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall 
not be considered an interruption of the consecutive 
day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child 
amount to which the abatement applies shall be cal-
culated by dividing the base child support award by 
the number of children included in the award. 1994 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate 
and just child support amount shall be ordered on a 
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not 
be less than the highest level specified in the table for 
the number of children due support. 1994 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership 
and functions. 
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, and every fourth 
year subsequently, the governor shall appoint an ad-
visory committee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the 
Office of Recovery Services; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the 
Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the 
Utah State Bar Association; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, 
not to exceed five, who represent diverse inter-
ests related to child support issues, as the gover-
nor may consider appropriate. However, none of 
the individuals appointed under this subsection 
may be members of the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion. 
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the 
child support guidelines to ensure their applica-
tion results in the determination of appropriate 
child support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legisla-
tive Judiciary Interim Committee on or before 
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or be-
fore October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee's report shall include recom-
mendations of the majority of the committee, as 
well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(3) The committee members serve without compen-
sation. Staff for the committee shall be provided from 
the existing budgets of the Department of Human 
Services and the Judicial Council. The committee 
ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent 
committee under this section is appointed. 1994 
78-45-7.14. B a s e combined child support obliga-
tion table and low income table. 
The following includes the Base Combined Child 
Support Obligation Table and the Low Income Table: 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION TABLE 
(Both Parents) 
Monthly 
Combined 
Adj. Gross Number of 
Income Children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 
1 2 3 4 5 
From 
650 — 
676 — 
701 — 
726 — 
751 — 
776 — 
801 — 
826 — 
851 — 
876 — 
901 — 
926 — 
951 — 
976 — 
1,001 — 
To 
675 
700 
725 
750 
775 
800 
825 
850 
875 
900 
925 
950 
975 
1.000 
1,050 
99 
103 
106 
110 
113 
117 
121 
124 
128 
132 
135 
139 
143 
146 
154 
184 
190 
197 
204 
211 
218 
224 
231 
238 
245 
251 
258 
265 
272 
285 
191 
198 
205 
212 
219 
226 
243 
253 
263 
274 
284 
294 
305 
315 
335 
198 
205 
212 
220 
227 
234 
261 
275 
289 
303 
316 
330 
344 
358 
385 
200 
207 
214 
221 
229 
236 
263 
277 
291 
305 
319 
333 
347 
361 
389 
201 
209 
216 
223 
231 
238 
265 
279 
294 
308 
322 
336 
350 
364 
393 
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Monthly 
Combined 
Adj. Gross 
Income 
1.051 — 
1.101 — 
1,151 — 
1.201 -
1.251 — 
1.301 — 
1,351 — 
1.401 — 
1.451 — 
1.501 — 
1.551 — 
1.601 — 
1.651 -
1.701 — 
1.751 — 
1.801 — 
1.851 — 
1.901 — 
1.951 -
2.001 — 
2.101 — 
2.201 — 
2.301 — 
2.401 — 
2.501 — 
2,601 — 
2.701 — 
2.801 — 
2.901 — 
3.001 — 
3.101 — 
3.201 — 
3.301 — 
3.401 — 
3.501 — 
3.601 — 
3.701 — 
3.801 — 
3.901 — 
4.001 — 
4.101 — 
4.201 — 
4.301 — 
4.401 — 
4,501 — 
4.601 — 
4.701 — 
4.801 — 
4.901 — 
5.001 — 
5.101 — 
5.201 — 
5.301 — 
5.401 — 
5,501 — 
5.601 — 
5.701 — 
5.801 — 
5.901 — 
6.001 — 
6,101 — 
6,201 — 
6.301 — 
6.401 — 
6.501 — 
6.601 — 
6/701 
6.801 — 
6.901 — 
7.001 — 
7,101 — 
7.201 — 
7,301 — 
7,401 — 
7,501 — 
7.601 — 
7,701 — 
7,801 — 
7.901 — 
8.001 — 
8,101 — 
8,201 — 
8.301 — 
8,401 — 
8.501 — 
8,601 — 
8.701 — 
1.100 
1.150 
1.200 
1.250 
1.300 
1.350 
1.400 
1.450 
1.500 
1.550 
1.600 
1.650 
1.700 
1.750 
1.800 
1.850 
1.900 
1.950 
2.000 
2.100 
2.200 
2.300 
2.400 
2.500 
2.600 
2.700 
2.800 
2.900 
3.000 
3.100 
3.200 
3.300 
3.400 
3.500 
3.600 
3.700 
3.800 
3.900 
4.000 
4.100 
4.200 
4.300 
4.400 
4.500 
4.600 
4.700 
4.800 
4.900 
5.000 
5.100 
5.200 
5.300 
5.400 
5.500 
5.600 
5.700 
5.800 
5.900 
6.000 
6.100 
6.200 
6.300 
6.400 
6.500 
6.600 
6.700 
6.800 
6.900 
7.000 
7.100 
7.200 
7.300 
7.400 
7.500 
7.600 
7.700 
7,800 
7,900 
8,000 
8.100 
8.200 
8,300 
8.400 
8.500 
8.600 
8,700 
8.800 
1 
161 
168 
176 
183 
190 
198 
205 
212 
220 
227 
234 
242 
249 
256 
264 
271 
278 
286 
293 
308 
319 
328 
336 
345 
354 
362 
371 
380 
388 
397 
406 
414 
423 
431 
438 
444 
451 
458 
465 
472 
479 
486 
493 
499 
506 
513 
520 
527 
534 
541 
547 
554 
561 
568 
575 
582 
586 
591 
596 
601 
605 
610 
615 
620 
624 
629 
629 
673 
680 
687 
694 
701 
706 
710 
715 
719 
723 
728 
732 
737 
741 
746 
750 
755 
759 
763 
768 
2 
299 
313 
326 
340 
353 
367 
381 
394 
408 
421 
435 
449 
462 
476 
489 
503 
517 
530 
544 
571 
592 
608 
625 
641 
658 
674 
691 
707 
724 
740 
756 
773 
789 
804 
817 
830 
843 
856 
870 
883 
896 
909 
923 
936 
949 
962 
975 
989 
1,002 
1,015 
1,028 
1.042 
1.055 
1.068 
1.081 
1,093 
1,103 
1.112 
1,122 
1,131 
1,141 
1,150 
1,159 
1,169 
1,178 
1,188 
1,188 
U 8 8 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,189 
1.197 
1,205 
1,213 
1,220 
1,228 
1,236 
1,244 
1,252 
1,259 
1,267 
1,275 
1,283 
1,291 
1,298 
Number of 
Children 
3 
356 
377 
387 
403 
418 
433 
448 
463 
478 
493 
509 
524 
539 
554 
569 
584 
597 
610 
622 
643 
666 
687 
708 
725 
746 
767 
788 
809 
830 
851 
872 
893 
914 
934 
953 
973 
992 
1.012 
1.031 
1.050 
1,069 
1.088 
1,107 
1.131 
1,150 
1.169 
1,188 
1,207 
1.226 
1,245 
1.264 
1,282 
1.300 
1.317 
1,335 
1.351 
1.367 
1.383 
1,398 
1,414 
1.430 
1,445 
1,461 
1.480 
1,495 
1,511 
1.511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,520 
1.531 
1,541 
1,551 
1.562 
1,572 
1,582 
1,592 
1,603 
1,613 
1,623 
1.633 
1.644 
1,654 
1,664 
1,675 
4 
413 
441 
449 
465 
482 
499 
515 
532 
549 
565 
582 
599 
615 
632 
649 
664 
677 
690 
700 
716 
741 
766 
791 
809 
834 
859 
885 
910 
936 
962 
987 
1,013 
1,039 
1.064 
1.090 
1,116 
1.141 
1,167 
1,192 
1.217 
1.242 
1,267 
1,292 
1,326 
1,350 
1,375 
1,400 
1.425 
1,450 
1,475 
1,500 
1,522 
1.544 
1.566 
1,588 
1,610 
1,632 
1.653 
1,675 
1,697 
1,719 
1,740 
1,762 
1,791 
1,812 
1,834 
1,834 
1334 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,841 
1.853 
1,864 
1,876 
1,887 
1,899 
1,911 
5 
417 
444 
454 
475 
496 
516 
537 
558 
579 
600 
620 
641 
662 
683 
704 
723 
736 
750 
752 
779 
807 
835 
862 
882 
909 
937 
964 
992 
1,020 
1,048 
1.076 
1,103 
1,131 
1,159 
1,187 
1,215 
1,243 
1,270 
1,297 
1,325 
1.352 
1.379 
1,407 
1,443 
1,470. 
1,498 
1,525 
1,552 
1,580 
1,607 
1,634 
1,658 
1,682 
1,706 
1,730 
1,754 
1,778 
1,802 
1,826 
1,850 
1,874 
1,897 
1,921 
1,951 
1,975 
1.998 
1,998 
1^998 
1,998 
1,998 
1.998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1.998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
2,000 
2.013 
2,026 
2,039 
2,052 
2,064 
2,077 
2,090 
2,103 
6 
421 
449 
460 
484 
508 
532 
556 
580 
605 
629 
653 
677 
701 
725 
749 
771 
786 
800 
813 
833 
862 
891 
921 
942 
972 
1,001 
1,031 
1,060 
1,090 
1,120 
1,149 
1,179 
1,208 
1,238 
1,268 
1,297 
1,327 
1,356 
1,386 
1,415 
1,444 
1,474 
1,503 
1,541 
1,570 
1,600 
1,629 
1,658 
1,687 
1,717 
1,746 
1,772 
1,797 
1,823 
1,848 
1,874 
1,899 
1,925 
1,950 
1,976 
2,001 
2,026 
2,052 
2,084 
2,109 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,137 
2,150 
2,164 
2,178 
2,192 
2.206 
2,220 
2,234 
2,247 
2.261 
Monthly 
Combined 
Adj. Gross 
Income 
8.801 — 
8,901 — 
9,001 — 
9,101 — 
9.201 — 
9,301 — 
9,401 — 
9,501 — 
9,601 — 
9,701 — 
9,801 — 
9,901 — 
10,001 — 
Monthly 
Adj. Gross 
Income 
From 
650 — 
676 — 
701 — 
726 — 
751 -
776 — 
801 — 
826 — 
851 — 
876 — 
901 — 
926 — 
951 — 
976 — 
1,001 — 
8,900 
9,000 
9,100 
9,200 
9,300 
9.400 
9,500 
9,600 
9.700 
9.800 
9,900 
10.000 
10,100 
Number of 
Children 
1 2 3 4 
772 1,306 1,685 1.922 
777 1,314 1,695 1,934 
781 1,322 1,705 1,945 
786 1,330 1,716 1,957 
790 1.337 1,726 1.969 
795 1,345 1,736 1.980 
799 1.353 1,747 1,992 
803 1,361 1,757 2.003 
808 1,369 1,767 2.015 
812 1.376 1,777 2,027 
817 1,384 1,788 2.038 
821 1,392 1,798 2,050 
826 1,400 1,808 2,061 
LOW INCOME TABLE 
To 
675 
700 
725 
750 
775 
800 
825 
850 
875 
900 
925 
950 
975 
1,000 
1,050 
(Obligor Parent Only) 
Number of 
Children 
1 2 3 4 
23 23 23 23 
45 46 46 47 
68 68 69 70 
90 91 92 93 
113 114 115 116 
137 138 140 
159 161 163 
182 184 186 
205 207 209 
228 230 233 
250 253 256 
276 279 
299 302 
326 
372 
78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
5 
2.116 
2.129 
2.141 
2,154 
2.167 
2.180 
2,193 
2.206 
2.218 
2.231 
2.244 
2.257 
2.270 
5 
24 
47 
71 
94 
118 
141 
165 
188 
212 
235 
259 
282 
306 
329 
376 
6 
2,275 
2,289 
2,303 
2,317 
2,330 
2,344 
2,358 
2,372 
2,386 
2,400 
2,414 
2,427 
2,441 
6 
24 
48 
71 
95 
119 
143 
166 
190 
214 
238 
261 
285 
309 
333 
380 
1994 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the 
medical < expenses of the minor children be provided 
by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to 
maintain L insurance for medical expenses. 
administrative
 w „ . acrencv mav consider the 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
the court or 
>• 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(O coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share 
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actu-
ally paid bv a parent for the children's Dortion of in-
surance. (4) The children's portion of the premium is a per 
capita share of the premium actually paid. The 
mium expense i 
pre-
for the children shall be calculated by 
dividing the premium amount by the number of per-
sons covered under the policy and multiplying the 
result by the number of children in the instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share 
equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medi-
cal expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children and actually paid 
by the parents (6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall 
provide verification of coverage to the other parent, 
or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., 
upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calen-
dar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or 
the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the 
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Social Security Act, 42 U S C Section 601 et seq , of 
any change of insurance earner, premium, or benefits 
within 30 calendar davs of the date he first knew or 
should have known of the change 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and payment 
of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 
da>s of payment 
(8) In addition to an\ other sanctions provided by 
the court a parent incurring medical expenses may 
be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses 
or to recover the other parent s share of the expenses 
if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and 
(7) 1994 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not 
incurred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each 
parent share equallv the reasonable work-related 
child care expenses of the parents 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is in-
curred a parent shall begin paying his share on a 
monthlv basis immediatelv upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expense, but if the child 
care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent 
may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without 
obtaining a modification of the child support or-
der 
(b) d) In the absence of a court order to the 
contrarv a parent who incurs child care ex-
pense shall provide written verification of 
the cost and identity of a child care provider 
to the other parent upon initial engagement 
of a provider and thereafter on the request of 
the other parent 
(n) In the absence of a court order to the 
contrary, the parent shall notify the other 
parent of anv change of child care provider 
or the monthlv expense of child care within 
30 calendar davs of the date of the change 
(3) In addition to am other sanctions provided by 
the court, a parent incurring child care expenses may 
be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses 
or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses 
if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply 
with Subsection (2Kb) 1994 
78-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child 
support order is presumed, if the custodial parent or 
the noncustodial parent during extended visitation, 
is working and actuallv incurring the child care costs 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not pre-
sumed, but may be awarded on a case-by-case basis, if 
the costs are related to the career or occupational 
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise or-
dered by the court in the interest of justice 1994 
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support or-
dered. 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child 
support award that mav be ordered using the base 
combined child support obligation table, using the 
low income table, or awarding medical expenses ex-
cept under Subsection (2) 
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in 
Section 78-45-7 14 in combination with the award of 
medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's ad-
justed gross income, or by adding the child care costs, 
total child support would exceed 50% of the obligor's 
adjusted gross income, the presumption under Sec-
tion 78-45-7 17 is rebutted 1994 
78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability. 
(1) The district court or administrative agency 
may issue an order determining the amount of a par-
ent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent 
child when the parent 
(a) is required by a prior court or administra-
tive order to 
d) share those expenses with the other 
parent of the dependent child, or 
(n) obtain insurance for medical expenses 
but fails to do so, or 
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer 
under insurance coverage obtained after the 
prior court or administrative order was issued 
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does 
not specify what proportions of the expenses are to be 
shared, the district court may determine the amount 
of liability as may be reasonable and necessary 
(3) This section applies to an order without regard 
to when it was issued 1994 
78-45-7.20. Accountabil i ty of support provided 
to benefit child — Accounting. 
(1) The court or administrative agency which is-
sues the initial or modified order for child support 
may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospec-
tively the obligee to furnish an accounting of 
amounts provided for the child's benefit to the obli-
gor, including an accounting or receipts 
(2) The court or administrative agency may pre-
scribe the frequency and the form of the accounting 
which shall include receipts and an accounting 
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting 
only if current on all child support that has been or-
dered 1994 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for depen-
dent children. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent 
should be awarded the right to claim a child or chil-
dren as exemptions for federal and state income tax 
purposes Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in 
wntmg, the court or administrative agency shall 
award in any final order the exemption on a case-by-
case basis 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or admin-
istrative agency shall consider 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contri-
bution of each parent to the cost of raising the 
child, and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax bene-
fit to each parent 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or 
administrative agency may not award any exemption 
to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not cur-
rent in his child support obligation, in which case the 
court or administrative agency may award an exemp-
tion to the custodial parent 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent 
unless the award will result in a tax benefit to that 
parent 1994 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or va-
cate the order of support where justice requires 1957 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor, and the office may proceed 
pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable 
statute, either on behalf of the Department of 
Human Services or any other department or 
agency of this state that provides public assis-
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tance, as defined by Subsection 62A-ll-303(3), to 
enforce the right to recover public assistance, or 
on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's 
right of support against the obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced 
by the office to enforce payment of the obligor's 
support obligation, it shall be the duty of the at-
torney general or the county attorney of the 
county of residence of the obligee to represent the 
office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file 
a pleading, or submit a written stipulation to the 
court, without complying with Subsection (2Kb), 
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or 
stipulation is to: 
(i) establish paternity; 
(ii) establish or modify a support obliga-
tion; 
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of 
payment of support; or 
(iv) recover support due or owing. 
(b) When taking an action described in Sub-
section (2)(a), a person must file an affidavit with 
the court at the time the action is commenced, 
the pleading is filed, or the stipulation submitted 
stating whether public assistance has been or is 
being provided on behalf of a child who is a sub-
ject of the action, pleading, or stipulation. If pub-
lic assistance has been or is being provided, the 
person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a 
copy of the pleading or stipulation to the office. 
(c) If public assistance has been or is being 
provided, tha t person shall join the office as a 
party to the action or mail or deliver a writ ten 
request to the office asking it to join as a party to 
the action. A copy of tha t request, along with 
proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The 
office shall be represented as provided in Subsec-
tion (1Kb). 
(3) Nei ther the at torney general nor the-county at-
torney represents or has an attorney-client relation-
ship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out 
the duties ar is ing under this chapter. 1994 
78-45-9.1. Repea led . 1984 
78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
The county attorney's office shall provide assis-
tance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act 
in the following manner: 
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial 
Council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment 
if the obligee is not represented by legal counsel; 
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a 
fee not to exceed $25 for providing assistance to 
an obligee under Subsection (1). 
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file impe-
cuniously if the obligee is unable to bear the ex-
penses of the action and assist the obligee with 
such filing; 
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods 
for service of process; and 
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously schedul-
ing a hear ing before the court. 1983 
78-45-10. Appeals . 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments 
under this act as in other civil actions. 1957 
78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged commu-
nication inapplicable — Competency 
of spouses. 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of 
communications between husband and wife are inap-
plicable under this act. Spouses are competent wit-
nesses to testify to any relevant matter, including 
marriage and parentage. 1957 
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those pres-
ently existing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not 
in substitution to any other rights. 1957 
78-45-13. Interpretat ion a n d construct ion . 
This act shal l be so interpreted and construed as to 
effectuate i ts general purpose to m a k e uniform the 
law of those s ta tes which enact it. 1957 
C H A P T E R 45a 
U N I F O R M ACT ON P A T E R N I T Y 
Section 
78-45a-l . 
78-45a-2. 
78-45a-3. 
78-45a-4. 
78-45a-5. 
78-45a-6. 
78-45a-6.5. 
78-45a-7. 
78-45a-8. 
78-45a-9. 
78-45a-10. 
78-45a-10.5. 
78 -45a - l l . 
78-45a-12. 
78-45a-13. 
78-45a-14. 
78-45a-15. 
78-45a-16. 
78-45a-17. 
Obligations of the father. 
Determination of paternity — Effect 
— Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the fa-
ther. 
Limitations on recovery from father's 
estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Paternity action — Jury trial. 
Authority for genetic testing. 
Selection of experts. 
Compensation of expert witnesses. 
Effect of genetic test results. 
Visitation rights of father. 
Judgment. 
Security. 
Settlement agreements. 
Venue. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
The father of a child that is or may be born outside 
of marriage is liable to the same extent as the father 
of a child bom within marriage, whether or not the 
child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the 
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the edu-
cation, necessary support, and any funeral expenses 
for the child. For purposes of child support collection, 
a child born outside of marriage includes a child born 
to a married woman by a man other than her hus-
band if that paternity has been established. 1990 
78-45a-2. Determinat ion of paternity — Effect — 
Enforcement . 
(1) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative 
father, or the public authority chargeable by law 
with the support of the child; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity exe-
cuted in accordance with Chapter 45e, Voluntary 
Declaration of Paternity Act. 
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been 
acknowledged according to the laws of this state or 
any other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
enforced in the same or other proceedings by: 
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority 
that has furnished or may furnish the reasonable 
expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, 
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(b) other persons including private agencies to 
the extent that they have furnished the reason-
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WILKINS, Judge: 
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are 
adequately presented in the brief and record and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah 
R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Appellant Selva McGinty seeks reversal of the trial court's 
determination that the ranch property acquired by the parties 
constituted a marital asset, or even if so, that the distribution 
of the asset should have been other than equal. To do so, 
appellant challenges the findings of fact entered by the trial 
court. 
Appellant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the 
evidence which supports the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrating that despite such evidence the findings are 
nevertheless so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. Haaan v. 
Haaan. 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991). We affirm the trial 
court's judgment. 
Appellee Lee McGinty seeks an award of attorney fees and 
costs incurred on appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rule 33(a) provides that if an appeal is 
"either frivolous or for delay, [the court] shall award^just 
damages, which may include single or double costs . . . and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney." A frivolous appeal is one that is "not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. 
App. P. 33(b). Further, a frivolous appeal "is one in which no 
justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily 
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect 
that it can ever succeed." Schoney v. Memoria, Estates, Inc.. 
863 P.2d 59, 63 (Utah App. 1993). Such is not uhe case here, 
"[a]lthough bordering perilously close to being frivolous." Call 
v. Citv of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, an appeal is for delay when "interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to . . . gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). 
Appellee has raised such a charge in her brief. In reply, 
appellant has elected to address only the question of whether or 
not his appeal is frivolous, and has left unanswered the claim 
that this appeal is interposed for the improper purpose of 
gaining time that benefits only himself. When considered in 
light of the findings of the trial court relating to appellant's 
intentional violation of the trial court's restraining order 
regarding the ranch property, and the dealings of appellant with 
the title to the ranch property, it becomes evident that the 
appeal here has been brought "for delay." The superficial nature 
of appellant's initial brief supports this conclusion. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, and hold that 
appellee is entitled to attorney fees and double costs incurred 
on appeal under Rule 33. We remand to the trial court for the 
sole purpose of determining the amount of attorney fees and 
double costs incurred by appellee on appeal. We leave to the 
sound discretion of the trial court the determination of whether 
the attorney fees and double costs are to be paid by appellant, 
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appellants attorney, or both, and if both, then in what 
proportions. 
ff±enaei~T. wiiKlns r~3vaq& 
WE CONCUR: 
*} 
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